I Know What You See: Power Side-Channel Attack on Convolutional Neural Network Accelerators
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Deep learning has become the de-facto computational paradigm for various kinds of perception problems, including many privacy-sensitive applications such as online medical image analysis. No doubt to say, the data privacy of these deep learning systems is a serious concern. Different from previous research focusing on exploiting privacy leakage from deep learning models, in this paper, we present the first attack on the implementation of deep learning models. To be specific, we perform the attack on an FPGA-based convolutional neural network accelerator and we manage to recover the input image from the collected power traces without knowing the detailed parameters in the neural network. For the MNIST dataset, our power side-channel attack is able to achieve up to 89% recognition accuracy.
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Cites
Membership Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning Models
Shokri, R., Stronati, M., Song, C., & Shmatikov, V. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2017.41 · Cited by 4,754 · cited 1×
“rom a model used in pharmacogenetics. Also on a face recognition system, they managed to reconstruct users’ face images enrolled in the training stage from the neural network models [2]. Shokri et al [25] presented a membership inference attack to decide whether a particular data record belongs to the model the traini…”
MethodEfficient Processing of Deep Neural Networks: A Tutorial and Survey
Sze, V., Chen, Y.-H., Yang, T.-J., & Emer, J. S. (2017) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2017.2761740 · Cited by 4,215
The Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settings
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Jha, S., Fredrikson, M., Celik, Z. B., & Swami, A. (2016) · 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2016.36 · Cited by 3,993
SecureML: A System for Scalable Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
Mohassel, P., & Zhang, Y. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2017.12 · Cited by 1,936
Hubara, I., Soudry, D., & Yaniv, R. E. (2016) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1602.02505 · Cited by 1,667
Cited by
When Machine Learning Meets Privacy: A Survey and Outlook
Liu, B., Ding, M., Shaham, S., Rahayu, W., Farokhi, F., & Lin, Z. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3436755 · Cited by 455
Model inversion attacks against collaborative inference
He, Z., Zhang, T., & Lee, R. B. (2019) · Proceedings of the 35th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference · doi:10.1145/3359789.3359824 · Cited by 313
Towards Energy-Efficient and Secure Edge AI: A Cross-Layer Framework ICCAD Special Session Paper
Shafique, M., Marchisio, A., Wicaksana Putra, R. V., & Hanif, M. A. (2021) · 2021 IEEE/ACM International Conference On Computer Aided Design (ICCAD) · doi:10.1109/iccad51958.2021.9643539 · Cited by 58
“For instance, the side-channel analysisbased monitoring [78]–[80] can monitor the side-channel signals that attackers can exploit.”
BackgroundMethodA survey on hardware security of DNN models and accelerators
Mittal, S., Gupta, H., & Srivastava, S. (2021) · Journal of Systems Architecture · doi:10.1016/j.sysarc.2021.102163 · Cited by 47
Metadata
- Authors
- Wei, L., Luo, B., Li, Y., Liu, Y., & Xu, Q.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2018-12-03
- Pages
- 393-406
- ISSN
- 1063-9527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4289146347
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 6.35
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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