The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Osiris: Hunting for Integer Bugs in Ethereum Smart Contracts
Open accessAbstract
The capability of executing so-called smart contracts in a decentralised manner is one of the compelling features of modern blockchains. Smart contracts are fully fledged programs which cannot be changed once deployed to the blockchain. They typically implement the business logic of distributed apps and carry billions of dollars worth of coins. In that respect, it is imperative that smart contracts are correct and have no vulnerabilities or bugs. However, research has identified different classes of vulnerabilities in smart contracts, some of which led to prominent multi-million dollar fraud cases. In this paper we focus on vulnerabilities related to integer bugs, a class of bugs that is particularly difficult to avoid due to some characteristics of the Ethereum Virtual Machine and the Solidity programming language.
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Towards verifying ethereum smart contract bytecode in Isabelle/HOL
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Tsankov, P., Dan, A., Drachsler-Cohen, D., Gervais, A., Bünzli, F., & Vechev, M. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1806.01143 · Cited by 196
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Practical Integer Overflow PreventionPreprint
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Survey on blockchain based smart contracts: Applications, opportunities and challenges
Hewa, T., Ylianttila, M., & Liyanage, M. (2021) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2020.102857 · Cited by 437
Empirical review of automated analysis tools on 47,587 Ethereum smart contracts
Durieux, T., Ferreira, J. F., Abreu, R., & Cruz, P. (2020) · Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE 42nd International Conference on Software Engineering · doi:10.1145/3377811.3380364 · Cited by 409
SoK: Decentralized Finance (DeFi)
Werner, S., Perez, D., Gudgeon, L., Klages-Mundt, A., Harz, D., & Knottenbelt, W. (2022) · Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies · doi:10.1145/3558535.3559780 · Cited by 404
Systematic Review of Security Vulnerabilities in Ethereum Blockchain Smart Contract
Kushwaha, S. S., Joshi, S., Singh, D., Kaur, M., & Lee, H.-N. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3140091 · Cited by 350
sFuzz: an efficient adaptive fuzzer for solidity smart contracts
Nguyen, T. D., Pham, L. H., Sun, J., Lin, Y., & Minh, Q. T. (2020) · Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE 42nd International Conference on Software Engineering · doi:10.1145/3377811.3380334 · Cited by 275
Metadata
- Authors
- Torres, C. F., Schütte, J., & State, R.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2018-12-03
- Pages
- 664-676
- ISSN
- 1063-9527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2908007588
- Cited by
- 440
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 22.92
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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