On the apparent conflict between individual and group fairness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A distinction has been drawn in fair machine learning research between 'group' and 'individual' fairness measures. Many technical research papers assume that both are important, but conflicting, and propose ways to minimise the trade-offs between these measures. This paper argues that this apparent conflict is based on a misconception. It draws on discussions from within the fair machine learning research, and from political and legal philosophy, to argue that individual and group fairness are not fundamentally in conflict. First, it outlines accounts of egalitarian fairness which encompass plausible motivations for both group and individual fairness, thereby suggesting that there need be no conflict in principle. Second, it considers the concept of individual justice, from legal philosophy and jurisprudence, which seems similar but actually contradicts the notion of individual fairness as proposed in the fair machine learning literature. The conclusion is that the apparent conflict between individual and group fairness is more of an artefact of the blunt application of fairness measures, rather than a matter of conflicting principles. In practice, this conflict may be resolved by a nuanced consideration of the sources of 'unfairness' in a particular deployment context, and the carefully justified application of measures to mitigate it.
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“Essentially, all normative assumptions are therefore captured in the choice of similarity metric [7].”
From Algorithmic Unfairness through the Lens of EU Non-Discrimination Law: Or Why the Law is not a Decision Tree (2023) · cites this paper as [7]
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“In addition, in cases where substantive differences of opinion exist between expertssuch as in the discourse on computational definitions of fairness [6,8,37]-designers of audit standards must navigate these nuances while also balancing to achieve a set of criteria that provides compliance and is operationalizable at scale.”
From A Framework for Assurance Audits of Algorithmic Systems (2024) · cites this paper as [6]
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Citations
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Why fairness cannot be automated: Bridging the gap between EU non-discrimination law and AI
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A clarification of the nuances in the fairness metrics landscape
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“…with gender, the issue weather it is fair to allow for a certain gender discrimination as long as justified by income can be seen as an instance of the conflict between individual or group notions, but it is rather a conflict about the underlying ethical and legal assumptions (Binns, 2020).”
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“As a result, group and individual fairness are frequently viewed as trade-offs, which is not always immediately evident (Binns 2020).”
Fairness in Information Access Systems
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Metadata
- Authors
- Binns, R.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Binns, Reuben
- ORCID
- Binns, Reuben
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2020-01-27
- Pages
- 514-524
- OpenAlex
- W2996424229
- Cited by
- 312
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 59 · 2024: 61 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 45 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 17
- FWCI
- 42.79
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Funders
- EPSRC (N02334X/1)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Social Sciences › Law › Discrimination and Equality Law
- Keywords
- individual fairness, group fairness, algorithmic fairness, individual justice, legal theory, fairness metrics
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