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On the apparent conflict between individual and group fairness

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Binns, Reuben · 2020 · Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

A distinction has been drawn in fair machine learning research between 'group' and 'individual' fairness measures. Many technical research papers assume that both are important, but conflicting, and propose ways to minimise the trade-offs between these measures. This paper argues that this apparent conflict is based on a misconception. It draws on discussions from within the fair machine learning research, and from political and legal philosophy, to argue that individual and group fairness are not fundamentally in conflict. First, it outlines accounts of egalitarian fairness which encompass plausible motivations for both group and individual fairness, thereby suggesting that there need be no conflict in principle. Second, it considers the concept of individual justice, from legal philosophy and jurisprudence, which seems similar but actually contradicts the notion of individual fairness as proposed in the fair machine learning literature. The conclusion is that the apparent conflict between individual and group fairness is more of an artefact of the blunt application of fairness measures, rather than a matter of conflicting principles. In practice, this conflict may be resolved by a nuanced consideration of the sources of 'unfairness' in a particular deployment context, and the carefully justified application of measures to mitigate it.

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Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. 10.2139/ssrn.3452030 · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3452030
  2. Danielle Keats Citron. 2007. Technological due process. Wash. UL Rev. 85 (2007), 1249.
  3. Oscar Gandy. 1995. It's discrimination, stupid. Resisting the virtual life: The culture and politics of information (1995), 35--47.
  4. bell hooks. 2014. Ain't IA Woman: Black women and feminism. Routledge New York, NY.
  5. RenÄl'e Jorgensen Bolinger. 2019. What is the Right to Individualized Judgement? Working Paper (on file with author) (2019).
  6. Sarah Moss. 2018. Probabilistic knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  7. John Rawls. 2009. A theory of justice. Harvard university press.
  8. Amartya Sen. 1992. Inequality reexamined. Clarendon Press.
  9. Larry S Temkin. 1986. Inequality. Philosophy & Public Affairs (1986), 99--121.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Binns, R.
Affiliations
University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Binns, Reuben
Venue
Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
Publisher
ACM
Published
2020-01-27
Pages
514-524
OpenAlex
W2996424229
Cited by
312
References
46
Citations by year
2026: 26 · 2025: 59 · 2024: 61 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 45 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 17
FWCI
42.79
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
Funders
EPSRC (N02334X/1)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Discrimination and Equality Law
Keywords
individual fairness, group fairness, algorithmic fairness, individual justice, legal theory, fairness metrics

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