The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
Open accessAbstract
The maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution—which selects an allocation that maximizes the product of utilities—is known to provide outstanding fairness guarantees when allocating divisible goods. And while it seems to lose its luster when applied to indivisible goods, we show that, in fact, the MNW solution is strikingly fair even in that setting. In particular, we prove that it selects allocations that are envy-free up to one good—a compelling notion that is quite elusive when coupled with economic efficiency. We also establish that the MNW solution provides a good approximation to another popular (yet possibly infeasible) fairness property, the maximin share guarantee, in theory and—even more so—in practice. While finding the MNW solution is computationally hard, we develop a nontrivial implementation and demonstrate that it scales well on real data. These results establish MNW as a compelling solution for allocating indivisible goods and underlie its deployment on a popular fair-division website.
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Cites
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Fair Division and Collective Welfare
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Self-citationThe Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
Budish, E. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/664613 · Cited by 766
Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'12)
Hoffmann, J., & Selman, B. (2012) · HAL · Cited by 754
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
Bogomolnaia, A., & Moulin, H. (2001) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2710 · Cited by 726
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Open Problems in Cooperative AI
Dafoe, A., Hughes, E., Bachrach, Y., Collins, T., McKee, K. R., Leibo, J. Z., Larson, K., & Graepel, T. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.08630 · Cited by 93
Diversity and Inclusion Metrics in Subset Selection
Mitchell, M., Baker, D., Moorosi, N., Denton, R., Hutchinson, B., Hanna, A., Gebru, T., & Morgenstern, J. (2020) · Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society · doi:10.1145/3375627.3375832 · Cited by 87
Metadata
- Authors
- Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A. D., Shah, N., & Wang, J.
- Venue
- ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
- Published
- 2019-08-31
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1-32
- ISSN
- 2167-8375 (ISSN-L)
- 2167-8383
- OpenAlex
- W3124038879
- Cited by
- 289
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 31.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A. D., Shah, N., & Wang, J. (2019). The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. https://doi.org/10.1145/3355902
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