Analyzing Information Leakage of Updates to Natural Language Models
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
To continuously improve quality and reflect changes in data, machine learning applications have to regularly retrain and update their core models. We show that a differential analysis of language model snapshots before and after an update can reveal a surprising amount of detailed information about changes in the training data. We propose two new metrics---differential score and differential rank---for analyzing the leakage due to updates of natural language models. We perform leakage analysis using these metrics across models trained on several different datasets using different methods and configurations. We discuss the privacy implications of our findings, propose mitigation strategies and evaluate their effect.
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“Recently, existing research has shown that the unlearning operation not only does not reduce the risk of user privacy leakage but actually increases this risk [106, 107].”
From Machine Unlearning: A Survey (2024) · cites this paper as [106]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Training data extraction attacks have until now been limited to small LMs trained on academic datasets under artificial training setups (e.g., for more epochs than typical) [8, 66, 68, 73], or settings where the adversary has a priori knowledge of the secret they want to extract (e.g., a social security number) [8, 27].”
From Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models (2020) · cites this paper as [73]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Prior work shows that (100 × to 1000 × smaller) language models potentially memorize training data in semi-realistic settings [8, 73].”
From Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models (2020) · cites this paper as [73]
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Cites
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“The most prominent are Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) using Long Short-Term Memory [10] cells (or variants thereof) and the more recent Transformers [15, 21].”
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“The most prominent are Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) using Long Short-Term Memory [17] cells (or variants thereof) and the more recent Transformers [23, 30].”
MethodBERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding
Devlin, J., Chang, M.-W., Lee, K., & Toutanova, K. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and Short Papers) · doi:10.18653/v1/n19-1423 · Cited by 54,325 · cited 2×
“(2) a model based on the Transformer architecture [21] (more concretely, using the BERT [6] codebase) with four layers of six attention heads, each with a hidden dimension of 192.”
BackgroundMethodBuilding a Large Annotated Corpus of English: The Penn Treebank
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Deep Learning with Differential Privacy
Abadi, M., Chu, A., Goodfellow, I., McMahan, H. B., Mironov, I., Talwar, K., & Zhang, L. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978318 · Cited by 6,578 · cited 1×
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Integrity and privacy in adversarial machine learning
Jagielski, M. (2021) · Digital Repository Service (Northeastern University) · doi:10.17760/d20413920 · Cited by 1
Defender: The Possibility of Repairing Jailbreak Defects
Wang, X., & Wei, Y. (2025) · Lecture notes in electrical engineering · doi:10.1007/978-981-96-1694-7_17
Updates Leakage Attack Against Private Graph Split Learning
Yang, H., Ma, Z., Liu, Y., Liu, X., Yang, B., & Ma, J. (2025) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-981-96-1528-5_1
Adopting LLMs in Internet of Cloud Ecosystems: Identifying the Key Privacy Challenges
Tsouplaki, A., Kalloniatis, C., & Mikros, G. K. (2025) · IFIP advances in information and communication technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-02504-3_21 · Cited by 1
Machine Unlearning Scheme for Recommendation System Based on Gradient Attribution
Peng, W., Liu, Q., Ma, D., Song, C., & Jiang, Y. (2025) · Journal of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.54097/gqxpaf75
“Firstly, considering privacy issues, large models such as recommender systems [5] and natural language models [6] may collect, use, and leak personal information without user permission.”
A Methodology and Tool for Automatic Workload Distribution. A Case Study on Federated Learning
Angelo, S. D., Martino, B. D., Vassallo, P., Liccardo, V. A., Carollo, A., Corridori, G., Spinatelli, G., & Polzella, F. (2025) · Lecture notes on data engineering and communications technologies · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-10344-4_4
Expert Consensus on LLM Safety in Clinical Decision Support
Gayathri, K. V., Kanshiya, S., Saranraj, P., Lokeshwari, B., Vilmasen, P., & Wins, J. A. (2026) · Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-7862-6.ch011
Nitz, L., Joglekar, C., Gurabi, M. A., Mandal, A., Monti, A., & Decker, S. (2026) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2026.3707894
“While we focus on information leakage in distributed voltage control, examples from other domains include peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems [11], wireless communication networks [12], and machine learning [13], [14], [15].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Zanella-Béguelin, S., Wutschitz, L., Tople, S., Rühle, V., Paverd, A., Ohrimenko, O., Köpf, B., & Brockschmidt, M.
- Affiliations
- Microsoft Research (United Kingdom) (GB)
- The University of Melbourne (AU)
- ORCID
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2020-10-30
- Pages
- 363-375
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3027379683
- Semantic Scholar
- 782e7fba4dfa8e2095a71cfcf85995543f37ac75
- Cited by
- 86
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 3
- FWCI
- 4.48
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Topic Modeling
- Keywords
- information leakage, natural language models, model updating, differential analysis, privacy, retraining, privacy mitigation
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