Cited by 29Cryptographic Implementations and SecurityPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataCryptography and Data Security

Randomness Concerns when Deploying Differential Privacy

Open access
Garfinkel, Simson L., Leclerc, Philip·2020·Proceedings of the 19th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society

Abstract

The U.S. Census Bureau is using differential privacy (DP) to protect confidential respondent data collected for the 2020 Decennial Census of Population & Housing. The Census Bureau's DP system is implemented in the Disclosure Avoidance System (DAS) and requires a source of random numbers. We estimate that the 2020 Census will require roughly 90TB of random bytes to protect the person and household tables. Although there are critical differences between cryptography and DP, they have similar requirements for randomness. We review the history of random number generation on deterministic computersømitt, including von Neumann's "middle-square'' method, Mersenne Twister (MT19937) (the default NumPy random number generator, which we conclude is unacceptable for use in production privacy-preserving systems), and the Linux /dev/urandom device. We also review hardware random number generator schemes, including the use of so-called "Lava Lamps'' and the Intel Secure Key RDRAND instruction. We finally present our plan for generating random bits in the Amazon Web Services (AWS) environment using AES-CTR-DRBG seeded by mixing bits from/dev/urandom and the Intel Secure Key RDSEED instruction, a compromise of our desire to rely on a trusted hardware implementation, the unease of our external reviewers in trusting a hardware-only implementation, and the need to generate so many random bits.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/3411497.3420211

Cites

26 of 26 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Cryptographically secure random noise generation is crucial to avoid vulnerabilities associated with default pseudo-random number generators.

    “Moreover, our framework includes support for cryptographically secure random noise generation which is crucial to avoid vulnerabilities associated with default pseudo-random number generators33.”

    From Medical imaging deep learning with differential privacy (2021) · cites this paper as [33]

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 13

  1. S. Das, J. Werner, M. Antonakakis, M. Polychronakis, and F. Monrose. 2019. SoK: The Challenges, Pitfalls, and Perils of Using Hardware Performance Counters for Security. In 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 20-38.
  2. Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam Smith. 2006. Cali- brating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis. In Proceedings of the Third Conference on Theory of Cryptography (TCCâĂŹ06). Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Hei- delberg, 265âĂŞ284. https:// doi.org/ 10.1007/ 11681878_14 · DOI · Paper page
  3. David Alan Grier. 2007. When Computers Were Human. Princeton University Press, USA.
  4. Z. Gutterman, B. Pinkas, and T. Reinman. 2006. Analysis of the Linux random number generator. In 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S P'06). 15 pp.-385.
  5. Peter Guttman. 2004. Cryptographic Security Architecture: Design and Verification. Springer.
  6. K. Inayah, B. E. Sukmono, R. Purwoko, and S. Indarjani. 2013. Insertion attack effects on standard PRNGs ANSI X9.17 and ANSI X9.31 based on statistical dis- tance tests and entropy difference tests. In 2013 International Conference on Com- puter, Control, Informatics and Its Applications (IC3INA). 219-224.
  7. Gilles Pokam, Cristiano Pereira, Klaus Danne, Lynda Yang, Sam King, and Jesep Torrellas. 2009. Hardware And Software Approaches For Deterministic Multi- Processor Replay Of Concurrent Programs. Intel Technology Journal 13 (2009). Issue 4.
  8. Hany Ragab, Alyssa Milburn, Kaveh Razavi, Herbert Bos, and Cristiano Giuffrida. 2021. CrossTalk: Speculative Data Leaks Across Cores Are Real. In IEEE Security and Privacy. Paper=https:// download.vusec.net/ papers/ crosstalk_sp21.pdfWeb=https:// www.vusec.net/ projects/ crosstalkCode=https:// github.com/ vusec/ ridl
  9. J. K. Salmon, M. A. Moraes, R. O. Dror, and D. E. Shaw. 2011. Parallel random numbers: As easy as 1, 2, 3. In SC '11: Proceedings of 2011 International Conference for High Performance Computing, Networking, Storage and Analysis. 1-12.
  10. L. H. C. Tippett. 1927. Random Sampling Numbers: Tracts for Computers, No. XV. University Press, Cambridge.
  11. Jon von Neumann. 1951. Various Techniques Used in Conneciton With Random Digits. Journal of Research, Applied Math Series 3 (1951), 36- 38. https:// mcnp.lanl.gov/ pdf_files/ nbs_vonneumann.pdf Summary written by George E. Forsythe.
  12. V. M. Weaver, D. Terpstra, and S. Moore. 2013. Non-determinism and overcount on modern hardware performance counter implementations. In 2013 IEEE Inter- national Symposium on Performance Analysis of Systems and Software (ISPASS). 215-224.
  13. Michael Wertheimer. 2015. Encryption and the NSA Role in International Stan- dards. (2015). http:// www.ams.org/ notices/ 201502/ rnoti-p165.pdf Note: At the time of publication, Michael Wertheimer was the Director of Research at the US National Security Agency. Last Accessed May 30, 2020.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Garfinkel, S. L., & Leclerc, P.
Affiliations
United States Census Bureau (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 19th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Publisher
ACM
Published
2020-11-09
Pages
73-86
OpenAlex
W3084157897
Cited by
29
References
23
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 6
FWCI
1.72
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (public-domain)
Funders
US Census Bureau
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
Keywords
differential privacy, random number generation, 2020 Census, Mersenne Twister, hardware random number generator, trusted hardware, privacy-preserving data collection

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review