Exposing Vulnerabilities of Deepfake Detection Systems with Robust Attacks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent advances in video manipulation techniques have made the generation of fake videos more accessible than ever before. Manipulated videos can fuel disinformation and reduce trust in media. Therefore detection of fake videos has garnered immense interest in academia and industry. Recently developed Deepfake detection methods rely on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to distinguish AI-generated fake videos from real videos. In this work, we demonstrate that it is possible to bypass such detectors by adversarially modifying fake videos synthesized using existing Deepfake generation methods. We further demonstrate that our adversarial perturbations are robust to image and video compression codecs, making them a real-world threat. We present pipelines in both white-box and black-box attack scenarios that can fool DNN-based Deepfake detectors into classifying fake videos as real. Finally, we study the extent to which adversarial perturbations transfer across different Deepfake detectors and create more accessible attacks using universal adversarial perturbations that pose a very feasible attack scenario since they can be easily shared amongst attackers. 1
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Cites
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Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning
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“Accuracy of Deepfake detectors on the FaceForensics++ HQ Dataset as reported in [57].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialUniversal Adversarial Perturbations
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Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples
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“Gaussian Blur Kernel k (d,d,σ ), d ∼ U[3, 7], σ ∼ U[5, 10] Gaussian Noise σ ∼ U[0.”
BackgroundMesoNet: a Compact Facial Video Forgery Detection Network
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Cited by
Deepfake Detection: A Comprehensive Survey from the Reliability Perspective
Wang, T., Liao, X., Chow, K. P., Lin, X., & Wang, Y. (2025) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3699710 · Cited by 107
Watch Those Words: Video Falsification Detection Using Word-Conditioned Facial Motion
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Wani, T. M., Qadri, S. A. A., Wani, F. A., & Amerini, I. (2024) · Foundations and Trends® in Privacy and Security · doi:10.1561/3300000048 · Cited by 16
DeepFake detection in the AIGC era: A survey, benchmarks, and future perspectives
Xie, S., Qiao, T., Li, S., Zhang, X., Zhou, J., & Feng, G. (2026) · Information Fusion · doi:10.1016/j.inffus.2025.103740 · Cited by 14
D4: Detection of Adversarial Diffusion Deepfakes Using Disjoint Ensembles
Hooda, A., Mangaokar, N., Feng, R., Fawaz, K., Jha, S., & Prakash, A. (2024) · 2024 IEEE/CVF Winter Conference on Applications of Computer Vision (WACV) · doi:10.1109/wacv57701.2024.00377 · Cited by 7
“Recent work has shown that these “ad-versarial deepfakes” can even be crafted in a black-box setting, where the attacker only has query access to the detector [23,30,31,66].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Hussain, S., Neekhara, P., Dolhansky, B., Bitton, J., Ferrer, C. C., McAuley, J., & Koushanfar, F.
- Venue
- Digital Threats: Research and Practice
- Published
- 2022-02-07
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1-23
- ISSN
- 2576-5337 (ISSN-L)
- 2692-1626
- OpenAlex
- W3164267381
- Cited by
- 30
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 1.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
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