A False Sense of Security?: Revisiting the State of Machine Learning-Based Industrial Intrusion Detection
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Anomaly-based intrusion detection promises to detect novel or unknown attacks on industrial control systems by modeling expected system behavior and raising corresponding alarms for any deviations. As manually creating these behavioral models is tedious and error-prone, research focuses on machine learning to train them automatically, achieving detection rates upwards of 99%. However, these approaches are typically trained not only on benign traffic but also on attacks and then evaluated against the same type of attack used for training. Hence, their actual, real-world performance on unknown (not trained on) attacks remains unclear. In turn, the reported near-perfect detection rates of machine learning-based intrusion detection might create a false sense of security. To assess this situation and clarify the real potential of machine learning-based industrial intrusion detection, we develop an evaluation methodology and examine multiple approaches from literature for their performance on unknown attacks (excluded from training). Our results highlight an ineffectiveness in detecting unknown attacks, with detection rates dropping to between 3.2% and 14.7% for some types of attacks. Moving forward, we derive recommendations for further research on machine learning-based approaches to ensure clarity on their ability to detect unknown attacks.
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“This empirically demonstrates that many ML-based IDS solutions behave more like implicit signature-based detectors that memorize trained attack patterns, rather than robust models of normal behavior, and thus exhibit limited generalization capability to unknown attacks.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [66]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Applying RF, SVM, and BLSTM-based IDS models to the Gas Pipeline dataset, they showed that although high F1 scores are achieved for attacks seen during training, recall for unseen attacks in some attack families deteriorates to as low as 3.2-14.7%.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [66]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Their experiments, in which certain attack types were deliberately excluded from training, showed that recall for unseen attack families could drop to as low as 3.2-14.7%.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [66]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“As pointed out by Kus et al. [66] in Section 4.3.6, many network-based ML models implicitly learn the 'signatures' of attacks present in the training set rather than truly modeling the distribution of normal behavior.”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [66]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“This addresses precisely the type of stealth, and zero-day attacks that traditional, purely statistical IDS tend to miss, and directly mitigates the limitations highlighted by Kus et al. [66].”
From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [66]
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Cites
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Cited by
Deep Learning vs. Machine Learning for Intrusion Detection in Computer Networks: A Comparative Study
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kus, D., Wagner, E., Pennekamp, J., Wolsing, K., Fink, I. B., Dahlmanns, M., Wehrle, K., & Henze, M.
- Affiliations
- RWTH Aachen University (DE)
- Fraunhofer Institute for Communication, Information Processing and Ergonomics (DE)
- ORCID
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 8th ACM on Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2022-05-30
- Pages
- 73-84
- OpenAlex
- W4280520332
- Cited by
- 28
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 3
- FWCI
- 6.54
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security (CPSS) (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- Fraunhofer-Publica (Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft) (submittedVersion)
- RWTH Publications (RWTH Aachen) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (EXC-2023 - 390621612)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Artificial Immune Systems Applications
- Keywords
- anomaly-based intrusion detection, industrial control systems, unknown attack detection, machine learning, behavioral modeling, evaluation methodology, detection rate, false sense of security, industrial cybersecurity
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- Kus, D., Wagner, E., Pennekamp, J., Wolsing, K., Fink, I. B., Dahlmanns, M., Wehrle, K., & Henze, M. (2022). A False Sense of Security?: Revisiting the State of Machine Learning-Based Industrial Intrusion Detection. Proceedings of the 8th ACM on Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop. https://doi.org/10.1145/3494107.3522773
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