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Timing attacks on Web privacy

Felten, Edward W., Schneider, Michael A.·2000·Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

We describe a class of attacks that can compromise the privacy of users' Web-browsing histories. The attacks allow a malicious Web site to determine whether or not the user has recently visited some other, unrelated Web page. The malicious page can determine this information by measuring the time the user's browser requires to perform certain operations. Since browsers perform various forms of caching, the time required for operations depends on the user's browsing history; this paper shows that the resulting time variations convey enough information to compromise users' privacy. This attack method also allows other types of information gathering by Web sites, such as a more invasive form of Web "cookies". The attacks we describe can be carried out without the victim's knowledge, and most "anonymous browsing" tools fail to prevent them. Other simple countermeasures also fail to prevent these attacks. We describe a way of reengineering browsers to prevent most of them. 1. Introduction ...

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Metadata

Authors
Felten, E. W., & Schneider, M. A.
Venue
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2000-11
Pages
25-32
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2040210405
Cited by
305
References
0
FWCI
19.85
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Timing attacks on Web privacy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/352600.352606
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Felten, E. W., & Schneider, M. A. (2000). Timing attacks on Web privacy. Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/352600.352606

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