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Timing attacks on Web privacy
Abstract
We describe a class of attacks that can compromise the privacy of users' Web-browsing histories. The attacks allow a malicious Web site to determine whether or not the user has recently visited some other, unrelated Web page. The malicious page can determine this information by measuring the time the user's browser requires to perform certain operations. Since browsers perform various forms of caching, the time required for operations depends on the user's browsing history; this paper shows that the resulting time variations convey enough information to compromise users' privacy. This attack method also allows other types of information gathering by Web sites, such as a more invasive form of Web "cookies". The attacks we describe can be carried out without the victim's knowledge, and most "anonymous browsing" tools fail to prevent them. Other simple countermeasures also fail to prevent these attacks. We describe a way of reengineering browsers to prevent most of them. 1. Introduction ...
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Cited by
Practical Timing Side Channel Attacks against Kernel Space ASLR
Hund, R., Willems, C., & Holz, T. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.23 · Cited by 393
Statistical identification of encrypted Web browsing traffic
Sun, Q., Simon, D. R., Wang, Y.-M., Russell, W., Padmanabhan, V. N., & Qiu, L. (2005) · Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/secpri.2002.1004359 · Cited by 377
A Practical Attack to De-anonymize Social Network Users
Wondracek, G., Holz, T., Kirda, E., & Kruegel, C. (2010) · 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2010.21 · Cited by 340
Cross-Tenant Side-Channel Attacks in PaaS Clouds
Zhang, Y., Juels, A., Reiter, M. K., & Ristenpart, T. (2014) · Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2660267.2660356 · Cited by 327
Keeping the Smart Home Private with Smart(er) IoT Traffic Shaping
Apthorpe, N., Huang, D. Y., Reisman, D., Narayanan, A., & Feamster, N. (2019) · Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies · doi:10.2478/popets-2019-0040 · Cited by 192
Metadata
- Authors
- Felten, E. W., & Schneider, M. A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2000-11
- Pages
- 25-32
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2040210405
- Cited by
- 305
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 19.85
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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