QuietPrint: Protecting 3D Printers Against Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks
Open accessAbstract
The 3D printing market has experienced significant growth in recent years, with an estimated revenue of 15 billion USD for 2025. Cyber-attacks targeting the 3D printing process whether through the machine itself, the supply chain, or the fabricated components are becoming increasingly common. One major concern is intellectual property (IP) theft, where a malicious attacker gains access to the design file. One method for carrying out such theft is through side-channel attacks. In this work, we investigate the possibility of IP theft via acoustic side channels and propose a novel method to protect 3D printers against such attacks. The primary advantage of our approach is that it requires no additional hardware, such as large speakers or noise-canceling devices. Instead, it secures printed parts by minimal modifications to the G-code.
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Cooling fans generate distinct acoustic signatures at different speeds.
“Cooling fans generate distinct acoustic signatures at different speeds [5].”
From Firewall3D: A Hardware Firewall for Defending 3D Printers Against Firmware Attacks (2026) · cites this paper as [5]
Cites
FLAW3D: A Trojan-Based Cyber Attack on the Physical Outcomes of Additive Manufacturing
Pearce, H., Yanamandra, K., Gupta, N., & Karri, R. (2022) · IEEE/ASME Transactions on Mechatronics · doi:10.1109/tmech.2022.3179713 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
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Firewall3D: A Hardware Firewall for Defending 3D Printers Against Firmware Attacks
Asgar, S. A. G., & Reddy, N. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2607.10484
“QuietPrint [5] investigates acoustic side-channel leakage in 3D printers and demonstrates how signals from cooling fans and stepper motors can be exploited to reconstruct printed objects.”
Self-citation
- Authors
- Ghazi Asgar, S. A., & Reddy, N.
- Affiliations
- Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
- Texas A&M University (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 12th ACM Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2026-05-31
- Pages
- 25-34
- OpenAlex
- W7162106169
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security (CPSS) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- NSF Grant CCRI (2234972)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
- Keywords
- 3D printer, acoustic side-channel attacks, intellectual property theft, hardware security, supply chain attacks
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