The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Secure smartcardbased fingerprint authentication
Abstract
In this paper, the fundamental insecurities hampering a scalable, wide-spread deployment of biometric authentication are examined, and a cryptosystem capable of using fingerprint data as its key is presented. For our application, we focus on situations where a private key stored on a smartcard is used for authentication in a networked environment, and we assume an attacker can launch o -line attacks against a stolen card.Juels and Sudan's fuzzy vault is used as a starting point for building and analyzing a secure authentication scheme using fingerprints and smartcards called a figerprint vault. Fingerprint minutiae coordinates mi are encoded as elements in a nite eld F and the secret key is encoded in a polynomial f(x) over F[x]. The polynomial is evaluated at the minutiae locations, and the pairs (mi, f(mi)) are stored along with random (ci, di) cha points such that di ≠ f(ci). Given a matching fingerprint, a valid user can seperate out enough true points from the cha points to reconstruct f(x), and hence the original secret key.The parameters of the vault are selected such that the attacker's vault unlocking complexity is maximized, subject to zero unlocking complexity with a matching fingerprint and a reasonable amount of error. For a feature location measurement variance of 9 pixels, the optimal vault is 269 times more difficult to unlock for an attacker compared to a user posessing a matching fingerprint, along with approximately a 30% chance of unlocking failure.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Jain, A. K., Nandakumar, K., & Nagar, A. (2008) · EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing · doi:10.1155/2008/579416 · Cited by 1,134
Biometric cryptosystems: issues and challenges
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A survey on biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics
Rathgeb, C., & Uhl, A. (2011) · EURASIP Journal on Information Security · doi:10.1186/1687-417x-2011-3 · Cited by 641
Combining Crypto with Biometrics Effectively
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Fingerprint-Based Fuzzy Vault: Implementation and Performance
Nandakumar, K., Jain, A. K., & Pankanti, S. (2007) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2007.908165 · Cited by 553
Metadata
- Authors
- Clancy, T. C., Kiyavash, N., & Lin, D. J.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMM workshop on Biometrics methods and applications - WBMA '03
- Publisher
- ACM Press
- Published
- 2003
- Pages
- 45
- OpenAlex
- W2165367855
- Cited by
- 482
- References
- 16
- Type
- conference abstract
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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