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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The UCONABCusage control model

Park, Jaehong, Sandhu, Ravi·2004·ACM Transactions on Information and System Security

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce the family of UCON ABC models for usage control (UCON), which integrate Authorizations (A), oBligations (B), and Conditions (C). We call these core models because they address the essence of UCON, leaving administration, delegation, and other important but second-order issues for later work. The term usage control is a generalization of access control to cover authorizations, obligations, conditions, continuity (ongoing controls), and mutability. Traditionally, access control has dealt only with authorization decisions on users' access to target resources. Obligations are requirements that have to be fulfilled by obligation subjects for allowing access. Conditions are subject and object independent environmental or system requirements that have to be satisfied for access. In today's highly dynamic, distributed environment, obligations and conditions are also crucial decision factors for richer and finer controls on usage of digital resources. Although they have been discussed occasionally in recent literature, most authors have been motivated from specific target problems and thereby limited in their approaches. The UCON ABC model integrates these diverse concepts in a unified framework. Traditional authorization decisions are generally made at the time of requests but hardly recognize ongoing controls for relatively long-lived access or for immediate revocation. Moreover,mutability issues that deal with updates on related subject or object attributes as a consequence of access have not been systematically studied.Unlike other studies that have targeted on specific problems or issues, the UCON ABC model seeks to enrich and refine the access control discipline in its definition and scope. UCON ABC covers traditional access controls such as mandatory, discretionary, and role-based access control. Digital rights management and other modern access controls are also covered. UCON ABC lays the foundation for next generation access controls that are required for today's real-world information and systems security. This paper articulates the core of this new area of UCON and develops several detailed models.

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Cites

Show all 25 references

Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. Baker , D. , Barnhart , R. , and Buss , T . 1997. PCASSO: Applying and extending state-of-the-art security in the healthcare domain . Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference.]] Baker, D., Barnhart, R., and Buss, T. 1997. PCASSO: Applying and extending state-of-the-art security in the healthcare domain. Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference.]]
  2. Bettini et al. 2002 . Obligation monitoring in policy management . Proceedings of the Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks.]] Bettini et al. 2002. Obligation monitoring in policy management. Proceedings of the Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks.]]
  3. Gunter , C. , Weeks , S. , and Wright , A . 2001. Models and languages for digital rights . Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.]] Gunter, C., Weeks, S., and Wright, A. 2001. Models and languages for digital rights. Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.]]
  4. Landwehr , C. 1997 . Protection (Security) Models and Policy The Computer Science and Engineering Handbook . CRC Press , Boco Raton, FL , 1914--1928.]] Landwehr, C. 1997. Protection (Security) Models and Policy The Computer Science and Engineering Handbook. CRC Press, Boco Raton, FL, 1914--1928.]]
  5. LaMacchia , B. 2002 . Key challenges in DRM: An industry perspective . Proceedings of the 2nd ACM DRM Workshop (in conjunction with ACM CCS Conference) November.]] LaMacchia, B. 2002. Key challenges in DRM: An industry perspective. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM DRM Workshop (in conjunction with ACM CCS Conference) November.]]
  6. MIT 2001. Ten emerging technologies that will change the world. MIT Technology Review (Jan/Feb).]] MIT 2001. Ten emerging technologies that will change the world. MIT Technology Review (Jan/Feb).]]
  7. Ryutov , T. and Neuman , C . 2001. The set and function approach to modeling authorization in distributed systems . Proceedings of the Workshop on Mathematical Methods and Models and Architecture for Computer Networks Security.]] Ryutov, T. and Neuman, C. 2001. The set and function approach to modeling authorization in distributed systems. Proceedings of the Workshop on Mathematical Methods and Models and Architecture for Computer Networks Security.]]
  8. Ryutov , T. and Neuman , C . 2002. The specification and enforcement of advanced security policies . Proceedings of the Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks.]] Ryutov, T. and Neuman, C. 2002. The specification and enforcement of advanced security policies. Proceedings of the Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks.]]
  9. Schaad , A. and Moffett , J . 2002. Delegation of obligation . Proceedings of the Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks.]] Schaad, A. and Moffett, J. 2002. Delegation of obligation. Proceedings of the Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks.]]
  10. Schneck , P. 1999 . Persistent access control to prevent piracy of digital information . Proceedings of the IEEE 87 , 7 (July).]] Schneck, P. 1999. Persistent access control to prevent piracy of digital information. Proceedings of the IEEE 87, 7 (July).]] · doi:10.1109/5.771075
  11. Sibert et al. 1995 . The DigiBox: A self-protecting container for information commerce . Proceedings of USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce.]] Sibert et al. 1995. The DigiBox: A self-protecting container for information commerce. Proceedings of USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce.]]
  12. Wang et al. 2002 . XrML---eXtensible rights Markup Language . Proceedings of ACM Workshop on XML Security.]] 10 .1145/764792.764803 Wang et al. 2002. XrML---eXtensible rights Markup Language. Proceedings of ACM Workshop on XML Security.]] 10.1145/764792.764803 · doi:10.1145/764792.764803

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Metadata

Authors
Park, J., & Sandhu, R.
Venue
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
Published
2004-02
Volume
7
Issue
1
Pages
128-174
ISSN
  • 1094-9224 (ISSN-L)
  • 1557-7406
OpenAlex
W2068189899
Cited by
956
References
25
FWCI
131.70
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Park, J., & Sandhu, R. (2004). The UCONABCusage control model. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security. https://doi.org/10.1145/984334.984339

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