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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 70 of the 70 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design

Kamenica, Emir · 2019 · Annual Review of Economics

Abstract

A school may improve its students’ job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A social planner might raise everyone's welfare by providing only partial information about solvency of banks. All of this can happen even when everyone is fully rational and understands the data-generating process. Each of these examples raises questions of what is the (socially or privately) optimal information that should be revealed. In this article, I review the literature that answers such questions.

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Metadata

Authors
Kamenica, E.
Venue
Annual Review of Economics
Published
2019-08-02
Volume
11
Issue
1
Pages
249-272
ISSN
  • 1941-1383 (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-1391
OpenAlex
W2946755081
Cited by
404
References
70
FWCI
10.03
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025739
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Kamenica, E. (2019). Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design. Annual Review of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025739

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.