The DOI matches its Crossref record; 70 of the 70 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design
Abstract
A school may improve its students’ job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A social planner might raise everyone's welfare by providing only partial information about solvency of banks. All of this can happen even when everyone is fully rational and understands the data-generating process. Each of these examples raises questions of what is the (socially or privately) optimal information that should be revealed. In this article, I review the literature that answers such questions.
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Citations
Cites
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness
Adkisson, R. V. (2008) · The Social Science Journal · doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2008.09.003 · Cited by 5,543
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Implications of rational inattention
Sims, C. A. (2003) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3932(03)00029-1 · Cited by 3,822
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
Grossman, S. J. (1981) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466995 · Cited by 2,483
Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.6.2590 · Cited by 1,903
Self-citationNash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Maskin, E. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00076 · Cited by 1,180
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555625 · Cited by 1,076
Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
Mertens, J. F., & Zamir, S. (1985) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01770224 · Cited by 757
Cited by
Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits
Slivkins, A. (2019) · Foundations and Trends® in Machine Learning · doi:10.1561/2200000068 · Cited by 780
Inherent Tradeoffs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores
(2023) · The Societal Impacts of Algorithmic Decision-Making · doi:10.1145/3603195.3603197 · Cited by 310
A model of online misinformation
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., & Siderius, J. (2024) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdad111 · Cited by 82
Walsh, J., Vaida, N., Coman, A., & Fiske, S. T. (2022) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/15291006231161337 · Cited by 26
“Persuasion is first and foremost about changing people’s attitudes (Crano & Prislin, 2006) and beliefs (Kamenica, 2019).”
BackgroundAlgorithmic monoculture and social welfare
(2023) · The Societal Impacts of Algorithmic Decision-Making · doi:10.1145/3603195.3603202
Metadata
- Authors
- Kamenica, E.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Economics
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2019-08-02
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 249-272
- ISSN
- 1941-1383 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-1391
- OpenAlex
- W2946755081
- Cited by
- 404
- References
- 70
- FWCI
- 10.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.