Cited by 82Misinformation and Its ImpactsGame Theory and ApplicationsSocial Media and Politics

A model of online misinformation

Acemoglu, Daron, Ozdaglar, Asuman, Siderius, James·2024·Review of Economic Studies

Abstract

Abstract We present a model of online content sharing where agents sequentially observe an article and decide whether to share it with others. This content may or may not contain misinformation. Each agent starts with an ideological bias and gains utility from positive social media interactions but does not want to be called out for propagating misinformation. We characterize the (Bayesian–Nash) equilibria of this social media game and establish that it exhibits strategic complementarities. Under this framework, we study how a platform interested in maximizing engagement would design its algorithm. Our main result establishes that when the relevant articles have low-reliability and are thus likely to contain misinformation, the engagement-maximizing algorithm takes the form of a “filter bubble”—creating an echo chamber of like-minded users. Moreover, filter bubbles become more likely when there is greater polarization in society and content is more divisive. Finally, we discuss various regulatory solutions to such platform-manufactured misinformation.

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Crossref · 10.1093/restud/rdad111

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  • This strategy places a premium on user attention, which has led companies to deploy AI and machine learning techniques to prolong user engagement, often to the detriment of individual and societal well-being.

    “This strategy places a premium on user attention, which has led companies to deploy AI and machine learning techniques to prolong user engagement, often to the detriment of individual and societal well-being (12–15).”

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Authors
Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A., & Siderius, J.
Affiliations
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology, NBER, and CEPR ,
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
  • Dartmouth College (US)
Corresponding author
Siderius, James
Venue
Review of Economic Studies
Published
2023-12-12
Volume
91
Issue
6
Pages
3117-3150
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
OpenAlex
W4389606860
Cited by
82
References
56
Citations by year
2026: 26 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1
FWCI
31.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Review of Economic Studies (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Communication › Social Media and Politics
Keywords
online misinformation, content sharing, social media, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, strategic complementarity, filter bubbles, echo chambers, ideological bias, polarization, content reliability, misinformation regulation

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