The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bank Capital and Financial Stability: An Economic Trade-Off or a Faustian Bargain?
Abstract
Financial crises impose large and persistent social costs, making banking stability important. This article reviews the central issues surrounding the role bank capital plays in financial stability. Because the socially efficient capital level may exceed banks’ privately optimal capital levels, regulatory capital requirements become germane. But such requirements may entail various bank-level and social costs. Thus, despite agreement that higher capital would enhance banking stability, recognition of these costs has generated theoretical disagreement over whether capital requirements should be higher. Empirical evidence reveals that, in the cross section of banks, higher capital is associated with higher lending, higher liquidity creation, higher bank values, and higher probabilities of surviving crises. Moreover, increases in capital requirements are met with modest declines in lending. The overarching message from research is that lower capital in banking leads to higher systemic risk and a higher probability of a government-funded bailout that may elevate government debt and trigger a sovereign debt crisis. Thus, capital regulation reform, as well as tax policy, should seek to increase bank capital. This article discusses the contemporary thinking on these issues and concludes with open research questions.
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Cites
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476 · cited 1×
“The economic role of banks involves taking on diversifiable risks and reducing contracting costs through the process of intermediation (e.g., Diamond 1984 and Ramakrishnan & Thakor 1984).”
BackgroundCan Relationship Banking Survive Competition?
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00223 · Cited by 1,590 · cited 1×
“…through qualitative asset transformation (QAT)—a process whereby the nature of a bank’s assets is typically different in many dimensions from the nature of its liabilities (see Bhattacharya & Thakor 1993; for more on QAT as an essential part of relationship banking, also see Boot & Thakor 2000).”
BackgroundSelf-citationMoral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1994) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527003 · Cited by 827
Self-citation
Cited by
FinTech and banking: What do we know?
Thakor, A. V. (2020) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2019.100833 · Cited by 1,378
Self-citationBank Capital and Lending Relationships
SCHWERT, M. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12604 · Cited by 392
The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation
Irani, R. M., Iyer, R., Meisenzahl, R. R., & Peydró, J.-L. (2021) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaa106 · Cited by 339
Bank Diversification and Overall Financial Strength: International Evidence
Doumpos, M., Gaganis, C., & Pasiouras, F. (2016) · Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments · doi:10.1111/fmii.12069 · Cited by 91
Metadata
- Authors
- Thakor, A. V.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2014-12-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 185-223
- ISSN
- 1941-1367 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-1375
- OpenAlex
- W3121229220
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 8.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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