The DOI matches its Crossref record; 85 of the 85 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Neurocognitive Bases of Human Volition.
Open accessAbstract
Volition refers to a capacity for endogenous action, particularly goal-directed endogenous action, shared by humans and some other animals. It has long been controversial whether a specific set of cognitive processes for volition exist in the human brain, and much scientific thinking on the topic continues to revolve around traditional metaphysical debates about free will. At its origins, scientific psychology had a strong engagement with volition. This was followed by a period of disenchantment, or even outright hostility, during the second half of the twentieth century. In this review, I aim to reinvigorate the scientific approach to volition by, first, proposing a range of different features that constitute a new, neurocognitively realistic working definition of volition. I then focus on three core features of human volition: its generativity (the capacity to trigger actions), its subjectivity (the conscious experiences associated with initiating voluntary actions), and its teleology (the goal-directed quality of some voluntary actions). I conclude that volition is a neurocognitive process of enormous societal importance and susceptible to scientific investigation.
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“In the case of free will, the idea that the skull marks a meaningful divide behind which some sacrosanct conscious agent orchestrates behaviour is extremely difficult to maintain in the face of philosophical, theoretical, and empirical objections [64,76–78].”
From Ethical considerations for the use of brain–computer interfaces for cognitive enhancement (2024) · cites this paper as [78]
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Northoff, G., Wainio‐Theberge, S., & Evers, K. (2019) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2019.05.002 · Cited by 272
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Metadata
- Authors
- Haggard, P.
- Affiliations
- University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Haggard, Patrick
- ORCID
- Haggard, Patrick
- Venue
- Annual Review of Psychology
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2019-01-04
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 9-28
- ISSN
- 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-2085
- OpenAlex
- W2888599222
- Cited by
- 126
- References
- 85
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 9
- FWCI
- 1.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Annual Review of Psychology (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Leverhulme Trust (RPG‐2016‐378)
- Conseil Régional, Île-de-France
- FP7 Ideas: European Research Council (323943)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
- Keywords
- volition, free will, goal-directed action, voluntary action, subjective experience, generativity, teleology, history of psychology
- MeSH terms
- Brain, Goals, Humans, Neuropsychology, Volition
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