The DOI matches its Crossref record; 92 of the 92 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 20 of the 72 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The Market Stability Reserve in the EU Emissions Trading System: A Critical Review
Open accessAbstract
Having experienced low prices for about a decade, the European Union Emissions Trading System has been supplemented with the market stability reserve (MSR) that adjusts the supply of allowances to market outcomes. We critically review the literature assessing the performance of the MSR against several policy objectives. In doing so, we cover both conceptual aspects and quantitative assessments. We conclude by pointing out important policy implications and open issues for further research.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This critical review assesses the EU ETS Market Stability Reserve (MSR) and concludes that it helped reduce the allowance overhang and revived prices in the short run, but does not reliably deliver its stated goals of increasing resilience and synergies with overlapping policies. It argues the banking-based design lacks a clear economic rationale and can destabilize prices, especially for anticipated shocks.
Key findings
- The MSR was introduced after a surplus of approximately 140% of annual ETS emissions in 2018. It adjusts supply via the total number of allowances in circulation (TNAC): intake above 833 million allowances, release of 100 million below 400 million, and idle in between. The 2018 reform doubled the intake rate and added cancellations, making the long-run cap endogenous.
- Short-term price support is limited, while long-term price and cancellation effects are highly uncertain. Cumulative MSR cancellation estimates range from 1–13 GtCO2 (Osorio et al. 2021) or 1–15 GtCO2 in Table 1; Bruninx et al. (2020) find 5.6–17.8 GtCO2 across demand trajectories; Quemin & Trotignon (2021) find around 5 GtCO2 under infinite horizon and around 10.5 versus 8 GtCO2 under rolling finite horizon with versus without full sophistication.
- Anticipated demand-reducing policies can backfire: if future scarcity falls, current prices drop, emissions rise, banking and MSR cancellations fall, potentially increasing total emissions (a green paradox). Unanticipated shocks are buffered, but anticipated shocks can make the implicit allowance supply curve downward-sloping and amplify price responses and self-fulfilling prophecies.
- The 2023 reform postpones the intake-rate decrease from 24% to 12% from 2023 to 2030, applies a 100% marginal intake rate when TNAC is between 833 and 1,096 million allowances, and caps the MSR at 400 million allowances from 2023. It retains the banking-based approach, so stabilizing and destabilizing effects may both strengthen.
Methods
- Critical literature review, not new empirical analysis. It covers conceptual/theoretical and applied/simulation-based studies on MSR performance.
- Organizes assessment around MSR objectives: short- and long-term price levels, price volatility/stability/resilience to shocks, and interactions with overlapping climate and energy policies; summarizes quantitative estimates in Table 1.
- Draws on studies using stylized theoretical models, detailed simulation models (e.g., electricity and industry sectors), stochastic dynamic optimization, and calibrated models with different assumptions about firm behavior.
Limitations
- Stated: MSR impacts are extremely sensitive to modeling approaches, parameters, and assumptions about firm behavior (e.g., cost optimization, discount rate, planning horizon, risk aversion); quantitative estimates vary widely; the objective of increasing low-carbon investment incentives is the least quantified; some analyses do not back-cast, so effect sizes may be unrealistic.
- Stated: no research to date on policymakers’ beliefs about MSR effects; the political dimension and market microstructure/noncompliance actors are understudied.
- Evident: As a review, findings synthesize existing literature rather than provide new primary data; conclusions depend on the reviewed studies’ models and assumptions, and the paper itself notes there is no single metric for MSR effectiveness.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
19 Valid · 2 Not valid · 35 Not checked · 48 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“If at the time the actual demand reduction takes place when the MSR has stopped taking in allowances, then the net effect of announcing a future allowance-demand-reducing climate policy is to increase total emissions (see Figure 1 b ).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Gerlagh et al. (2021) source
Section 3.4 reports that when a demand-reducing policy is announced in 2020 but takes effect in 2048 or later, its net effect in the simulations is to increase cumulative emissions. Section 3.3 identifies 2048 as the point after which the MSR stops taking in allowances. No page number is provided in the supplied passages. (LLM, conf=0.92)
- Not matchedcites Perino et al. (2022a)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
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- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Gerlagh et al. (2021) and Perino et al. (2022a) formally show that adjusting the long-run cap based on the number of banked allowances is a double-edged sword.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Gerlagh et al. (2021) source
The Model section shows both edges of a cap tied to banked allowances: cancellation makes early demand-reducing policies lower cumulative emissions, but anticipated future demand reductions can instead increase them. The Policy Implications section likewise says MSR cancellation reduces emissions overall while its interaction with other emissions-reducing policies may be counterproductive. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.93)
- Not matchedcites Perino et al. (2022a)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Illustrating the importance of these factors, Baudry et al. (2021) find that ignoring transaction costs can lead to underestimating the price increase in response to a reduction in supply (as is the case under the current MSR withdrawal mode).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Baudry et al. (2021) source
The Introduction states that, in the authors’ calibrated setting, ignoring transaction costs underestimates the price increase following a reduction in total permits. Section 4.2.1 likewise reports larger price increases with trading costs than in the frictionless case. The claim says this *can* happen, which fits the paper’s qualified finding. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“They quantify how the effect of the MSR on the long-term price is highly dependent on the discount rate (a higher discount rate implies less banking and thus fewer cancellations) and the linear reduction factor (LRF; a higher LRF implies more banking and thus more cancellations but this effect saturates).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Osorio et al. (2021) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2 explains that a higher discount rate means less banking and fewer MSR cancellations; Section 3.4.1 finds that increasing the LRF initially raises cancellations, but that the effect weakens and reverses above about 3%. The paper links cancellations to higher allowance prices in Section 3.2, but the cited passages quantify sensitivity of cancellations, not the MSR’s effect on the long-term price as the claim states. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“First, it sustains multiple equilibria and affects market liquidity in ways that blur predictability of market outcomes (Gerlagh et al. 2021, Perino et al. 2022b)”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Gerlagh et al. 2021 source
Appendix C, in the Figure 5 caption, explicitly describes “the multiplicity of equilibria generated by the MSR” and identifies three equilibria in the illustrated case. (LLM, conf=0.94)
- Not matchedcites Perino et al. 2022b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 3.2. Applied Analysis
“Total cancellation volume and hence scale of price rise highly uncertain (1-15 GtCO 2 range)”
§ 3.2. Applied Analysis
“they find cancellations by the MSR spanning 5.6 to 17.8 GtCO2 for different demand trajectories.”
Citations
Cites
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets
De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H., & Waldmann, R. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261703 · Cited by 6,234 · cited 1×
“…flexibility mechanisms should neither invite speculative trading nor undermine market stability in the sense of ensuring the ability of market forces to keep prices in line with fundamentals (i.e., anticipated allowance scarcity) and keep the impact of noise trading in check (De Long et al.1990).”
BackgroundWeitzman, M. L. (1974) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296698 · Cited by 2,071
Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty
Roberts, M. J., & Spence, M. (1976) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(76)90014-1 · Cited by 775
Combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate change
Pizer, W. A. (2002) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00118-9 · Cited by 697 · cited 2×
“Although previous theoretical (Roberts & Spence 1976, Pizer 2002, Newell et al. 2005, Murray et al. 2009, Burtraw et al. 2022) and most practical [Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), California’s cap-and-trade program] attempts at managing allowance markets have explicitly defined allowance…”
BackgroundThe European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results
Ellerman, A. D., & Buchner, B. K. (2007) · Review of Environmental Economics and Policy · doi:10.1093/reep/rem003 · Cited by 656 · cited 1×
“Due to several constraints caused by, for example, the retention of sovereignty in taxation by its member states, an EU-wide harmonized carbon tax was politically infeasible (Christiansen & Wettestad 2003, Ellerman & Buchner 2007).”
BackgroundKoch, N., Fuss, S., Grosjean, G., & Edenhofer, O. (2014) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.06.024 · Cited by 448 · cited 1×
“There was no sustained impact on prices as would be expected in a market with well-functioning intertemporal arbitrage (Koch et al. 2014, Richstein et al. 2015, Salant 2016, Chaton et al. 2018).”
BackgroundPolitical internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy
Aidt, T. S. (1998) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00006-1 · Cited by 365 · cited 1×
“Further economic research could complement and extend this line of work, notably in the tradition of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics (see,notably,Aidt 1998).”
BackgroundBankable permits for the control of environmental pollution
Kling, C., & Rubin, J. (1997) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(96)01600-3 · Cited by 273 · cited 1×
“They build on the work of Kling & Rubin (1997), who suggested a time-dependent trading ratio to move allowances from one period to the next and combine it with a rule to set the cap in the final period that includes counterbalancing the bank of allowances.”
BackgroundSchennach, S. M. (2000) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1006/jeem.1999.1122 · Cited by 268 · cited 1×
“In between these two types of approaches, Quemin & Trotignon (2021) derive expected equilibrium paths along certainty-equivalent paths for baseline emissions, invoking a first-order approximation first suggested by Schennach (2000).”
BackgroundNew EU ETS Phase 4 rules temporarily puncture waterbed
Perino, G. (2018) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0120-2 · Cited by 192
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 20
- Aldy JE, 2022, J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ., 9, 921
- Burtraw D., 2015, Resources Magazine
- Burtraw D, 2022, J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ., 9, 851
- Doda B, 2022, ETS alignment: a price collar proposal for carbon market integration
- ESMA (Eur. Secur. Mark. Auth.), 2022, Final report on emission allowances and associated derivatives
- Eur. Parliam., 2022, Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 22 June 2022 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757 (COM20210551–C9-0318/2021-2021/0211(COD)
- Eur. Union, 2014, Accompanying the document Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 2003/87/EC
- Eur. Union, 2015, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 Concerning the Establishment and Operation of a Market Stability Reserve for the Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme and Amending Directive 2003/87/EC
- Eur. Union, 2018, Publication of the total number of allowances in circulation in 2017 for the purposes of the Market Stability Reserve under the EU Emissions Trading System established by Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
- Eur. Union, 2021, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757, Annex 7: Legal Review of the Market Stability Reserve
- Eur. Union, 2022, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757
- Friedrich M, 2020, From fundamentals to financial assets: the evolution of understanding price formation in the EU ETS
- Lausen J, 2022, Trading activities and strategies in the European carbon market
- Marcu A, 2023, EU ETS Review: political agreement after trilogues
- Pahle M, 2021, CESifo Forum, 22, 41
- Pirrong SC., 2009, Market oversight for cap-and-trade: efficiently regulating the carbon derivatives market
- Reg. Greenhouse Gas Init., 2017, Model Rule—Part XX CO2 Budget Trading Program
- Weitzman ML., 1978, Am. Econ. Rev., 68, 683
- Willner M, 2022, An upgrade for the EU ETS: Making Art. 29a and 30h fit for effective price containment
- Willner M, 2022, Politics Gov., 10, 256
Cited by
The environmental-financial performance nexus of EU ETS firms: A quantile regression approach
Flori, A., Borghesi, S., & Marin, G. (2024) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107328 · Cited by 49
“…et al., 2017), while others have analysed the policy design of the EU ETS (see, e.g., Sijm, 2005; Hepburn et al., 2006; Convery, 2009; De Perthuis and Trotignon, 2014; Kollenberg and Taschini, 2016; Koch et al., 2016; Perino and Willner, 2016; Naegele and Zaklan, 2019 and Borghesi et al., 2023).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe emerging endgame: The EU ETS on the road towards climate neutrality
Pahle, M., Quemin, S., Osorio, S., Günther, C., & Pietzcker, R. (2025) · Resource and Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101476 · Cited by 61
Self-citationDesign and impact assessment of policies to overcome oversupply in China's national carbon market
Ji, C.-J., Wang, X., Wang, X.-Y., & Tang, B.-J. (2024) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2024.120388 · Cited by 38
The Emerging Endgame: The EU ETS on the Road Towards Climate NeutralityPreprint
Pahle, M., Quemin, S., Osorio, S., Günther, C., & Pietzcker, R. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4373443 · Cited by 34
“This is amplified by regulatory uncertainty: First, tapping into the MSR to fund part of the REPowerEU plan may possibly undermine confidence in the system overall (Borghesi et al., 2023).”
Self-citationPerino, G., Ritz, R. A., & van Benthem, A. (2025) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1093/ej/ueaf021 · Cited by 23
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Borghesi, S., Pahle, M., Perino, G., Quemin, S., & Willner, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Siena (IT)
- Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (DE)
- Universität Hamburg (DE)
- Électricité de France (France) (FR)
- Venue
- Annual Review of Resource Economics
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2023-10-05
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 131-152
- ISSN
- 1941-1340 (ISSN-L)
- 1941-1359
- OpenAlex
- W4383498712
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 83
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 2
- FWCI
- 3.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Annual Review of Resource Economics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- Publication Database PIK (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Cadmus - EUI Research Repository (European University Institute) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Use Siena air (University of Siena) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (EXC2037, 390683824)
- Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (03SFK5S0)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Social Sciences › Law › EU Law and Policy Analysis
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › General Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Agricultural Economics and Policy
- Keywords
- Market Stability Reserve, EU Emissions Trading System, carbon pricing, emission allowances, carbon price volatility, climate policy, policy evaluation
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