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Cited by 281

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 55 of the 55 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

DETERRENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates

Huth, Paul K. · 1999 · Annual Review of Political Science

Abstract

▪ Abstract The utility of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of international relations research. Rational choice models have provided the foundation for theorizing about the conditions under which conventional deterrence is likely to succeed or fail. Rational deterrence theorists have focused on four sets of variables: the balance of military forces, costly signaling and bargaining behavior, reputations, and interests at stake. Over the past two decades, scholars have tested propositions from rational deterrence theory utilizing both statistical and comparative case study methods. Although the empirical results from these tests have supported a number of hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature, they have also challenged some theoretical arguments and have sparked vigorous debates about both theory and research designs for conducting empirical research.

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Metadata

Authors
Huth, P. K.
Venue
Annual Review of Political Science
Published
1999-06
Volume
2
Issue
1
Pages
25-48
ISSN
  • 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-1577
OpenAlex
W2156186782
Cited by
281
References
55
FWCI
1.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: DETERRENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.25
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Huth, P. K. (1999). DETERRENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates. Annual Review of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.25

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.