Cooperation under the security dilemma
Abstract
International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Two approaches are used to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. First, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. Second, the security dilemma is ameliorated when the defense has the advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. These two variables, which can generate four possible security worlds, are influenced by geography and technology.
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This situation produces mutual mistrust akin to the security dilemma, hence a spiral of fear and hatred.
“This situation produces mutual mistrust akin to the security dilemma (Jervis 1978), hence a spiral of fear and hatred (Kaufman 2011).”
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“This situation produces mutual mistrust akin to the security dilemma (Jervis 1978), hence a spiral of fear and hatred (Kaufman 2011).”
- Authors
- Jervis, R.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Corresponding author
- Jervis, Robert
- Venue
- World Politics
- Publisher
- Project MUSE
- Published
- 1978-01
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 167-214
- ISSN
- 0043-8871 (ISSN-L)
- 1086-3338
- OpenAlex
- W4230800277
- Cited by
- 2,305
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 151 · 2025: 158 · 2024: 148 · 2023: 194 · 2022: 141 · 2021: 131 · 2020: 177 · 2019: 131 · 2018: 67 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 62 · 2015: 61 · 2014: 48 · 2013: 50 · 2012: 26
- FWCI
- 10.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- World Politics (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Global Security and Public Health
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- security dilemma, international anarchy, interstate cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, mutual security, defensive posture, military technology, state security
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