The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Phronesis and the Knowledge-Action Gap in Moral Psychology and Moral Education: A New Synthesis?
Open accessAbstract
This article has two aims. First, to offer a critical review of the literatures on two well-known single-component solutions to the problem of a gap between moral knowledge and moral action: moral identity and moral emotions. Second, to take seriously the rising interest in Aristotle-inspired virtue ethics and character development within the social sciences: approaches that seem to assume that the development of phronesis (practical wisdom) bridges the gap in question. Since phronesis is a multicomponent construct, the latter part of this article offers an overview of what those different components would be, as a necessary precursor to operationalising them if the phronesis hypothesis were to be subjected to empirical scrutiny. The idea of a neo-Aristotelian multicomponent solution to the “gappiness problem” invites comparisons with another multicomponent candidate, the neo-Kohlbergian four-component model, with which it shares at least surface similarities. Some space is thus devoted to the proposed theoretical uniqueness of a phronesis-based multicomponent model vis-à-vis the neo-Kohlbergian one. Our main conclusion is that – weaknesses in its developmental psychological grounding notwithstanding – operationalising the phronesis model for the purposes of instrument design and empirical inquiry would be a feasible and potentially productive enterprise.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it Can Succeed Again
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511810503 · Cited by 4,681
The self-importance of moral identity
Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2002) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423 · Cited by 3,522 · cited 4×
“There may, however, be individual differences with how central these moral schemas are to the sense of self, as well as situational differences in how easily accessible they are (Aquino et al., 2009). As such, while a sociocognitive approach would agree that moral identity is fairly stable over time, akin to a trait-b…”
InfluentialThe relation of empathy to prosocial and related behaviors
Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. A. (1987) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.101.1.91 · Cited by 2,672 · cited 3×
“Eisenberg and Miller (1987) define empathy as “an affective state that stems from the apprehension of another’s emotional state that is congruent with it” (p. 91).”
BackgroundResultEmotion, regulation, and moral development
Eisenberg, N. (2000) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.665 · Cited by 2,422
Annas, J. (2011) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228782.001.0001 · Cited by 1,118
Dispositional and Organizational Influences on Sustained Volunteerism: An Interactionist Perspective
Penner, L. A. (2002) · Journal of Social Issues · doi:10.1111/1540-4560.00270 · Cited by 989 · cited 1×
“Similarly, Davis et al. (1999) found adults with higher levels of sympathy to be more likely to engage in volunteering (see also Penner, 2002).”
BackgroundA Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Morality Research
Rest, J. R., Narvaez, D., Thoma, S. J., & Bebeau, M. J. (2000) · Journal of Moral Education · doi:10.1080/713679390 · Cited by 441 · cited 2×
“Kohlbergians’, especially James Rest, Darcia Narvaez, Stephen Thoma, and Muriel Bebeau (Rest et al., 2000).”
BackgroundDoes moral identity effectively predict moral behavior?: A meta-analysis
Hertz, S. G., & Krettenauer, T. (2016) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/gpr0000062 · Cited by 401
Grossmann, I. (2017) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691616672066 · Cited by 306
Cited by
The Science of Wisdom in a Polarized World: Knowns and Unknowns
Grossmann, I., Weststrate, N. M., Ardelt, M., Brienza, J. P., Dong, M., Ferrari, M., Fournier, M. A., Hu, C. S., Nusbaum, H. C., & Vervaeke, J. (2020) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2020.1750917 · Cited by 330
“The Aristotelian notion of phronesis (Darnell et al., 2019) highlights a unique function of wisdom—understanding which actions fit which situations at hand (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialLost in Translation: The Construct Representation of Character Virtues
Ng, V., & Tay, L. (2020) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691619886014 · Cited by 99
Wisdom is a social-ecological rather than person-centric phenomenon
Grossmann, I., Dorfman, A., & Oakes, H. (2020) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2019.07.010 · Cited by 52
Peetz, J., & Grossmann, I. (2021) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550620931985 · Cited by 15
“Since Aristotle, practical wisdom has focused on sound judgments in challenging situations (Darnell et al., 2019).”
BackgroundAssessing and dissociating virtues from the ‘bottom up’: A case study of generosity vs. fairness
Kraft-Todd, G. T., Kleiman-Weiner, M., & Young, L. (2023) · The Journal of Positive Psychology · doi:10.1080/17439760.2022.2154254 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Darnell, C., Gulliford, L., Kristjánsson, K., & Paris, P.
- Venue
- Human Development
- Publisher
- S. Karger AG
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 101-129
- ISSN
- 0018-716X (ISSN-L)
- 1423-0054
- OpenAlex
- W2912708568
- Cited by
- 215
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 66.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Phronesis and the Knowledge-Action Gap in Moral Psychology and Moral Education: A New Synthesis? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1159/000496136
- The paper
- Darnell, C., Gulliford, L., Kristjánsson, K., & Paris, P. (2019). Phronesis and the Knowledge-Action Gap in Moral Psychology and Moral Education: A New Synthesis? Human Development. https://doi.org/10.1159/000496136
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.