The DOI matches its Crossref record; 78 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
Abstract
In recent decades, countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions, including alternative exchange-rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence. Political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions, emphasizing their role in resolving both the time-inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy. This “first-generation” work, however, suffers from a central limitation: it studies exchange-rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other. By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange-rate regime and central bank independence together and, in so doing, present a “second generation” of research on the determinants of monetary institutions. The articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions, investigating how political institutions, democratic processes, political party competition, and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives.
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Cites
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
Kydland, F. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1977) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260580 · Cited by 7,905
A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas
Mundell, R. A. (1961) · Cited by 4,467
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296528 · Cited by 3,905
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-x · Cited by 3,610
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates
Mundell, R. A. (1963) · The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science · doi:10.2307/139336 · Cited by 2,702
Calvo, G., & Reinhart, C. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7993 · Cited by 2,063
Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence
Alesina, A., & Summers, L. H. (1993) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2077833 · Cited by 1,833
One money, one market: the effect of common currencies on trade
Rose, A. K. (2000) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/1468-0327.00056 · Cited by 1,819
Cited by
Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics
Agnew, J. (2005) · Annals of the Association of American Geographers · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8306.2005.00468.x · Cited by 641
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court
Simmons, B. A., & Danner, A. (2010) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818310000044 · Cited by 466
Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence
Polillo, S., & Guillén, M. F. (2005) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/428685 · Cited by 412
Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set
Garriga, A. C. (2016) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813 · Cited by 411
The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm
Hyde, S. D. (2011) · Cornell University Press eBooks · doi:10.7591/cornell/9780801449666.001.0001 · Cited by 342
Metadata
- Authors
- Bernhard, W., Broz, J. L., & Clark, W. R.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2002
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 693-723
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2153911747
- Cited by
- 275
- References
- 78
- FWCI
- 20.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.