Cited by 1,416Game Theory and Voting SystemsPolitical Systems and GovernancePolitical Conflict and Governance

On the Number and Size of Nations

Alesina, A., Spolaore, E.·1997·The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

This paper studies the equilibrium determination of the number of countries in different political regimes, and in different economic environments, with more or less economic integration. We focus on the trade-off between the benefits of large jurisdictions and the costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse populations. Our model implies that (i) democratization leads to secessions; (ii) in equilibrium one generally observes an inefficiently large number of countries; (iii) the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in the amount of economic integration.

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Crossref · 10.1162/003355300555411

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Authors
Alesina, A., & Spolaore, E.
Affiliations
  • Center for Economic and Policy Research (US)
  • Boston College (US)
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
1997-11-01
Volume
112
Issue
4
Pages
1027-1056
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2149899514
Cited by
1,416
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 54 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 76 · 2019: 40 · 2018: 75 · 2017: 46 · 2016: 54 · 2015: 58 · 2014: 43 · 2013: 51 · 2012: 56
FWCI
61.38
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Systems and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
Keywords
political regimes, democratization, secession, economic integration, population heterogeneity

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