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Cited by 1,171

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Separation of Powers and Political Accountability

Open access
Persson, T., Roland, G., Tabellini, G.·1997·The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other to the voters' advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information.

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Metadata

Authors
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
1997-11-01
Volume
112
Issue
4
Pages
1163-1202
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2089003389
Cited by
1,171
References
1
FWCI
211.18
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Separation of Powers and Political Accountability. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/003355300555457
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Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of Powers and Political Accountability. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555457

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