The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion
Abstract
This paper studies the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on output volatility and economic growth. Using data for 91 countries, we isolate three empirical regularities: (1) governments that use fiscal policy aggressively induce significant macroeconomic instability; (2) the volatility of output caused by discretionary fiscal policy lowers economic growth by more than 0.8 percentage points for every percentage point increase in volatility; (3) prudent use of fiscal policy is explained to a large extent by the presence of political constraints and other political and institutional variables. The evidence in the paper supports arguments for constraining discretion by imposing institutional restrictions on governments as a way to reduce output volatility and increase the rate of economic growth.
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Cites
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
Econometric Analysis of Panel Data
Baltagi, B. H. (2021) · Springer Texts in Business and Economics · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-53953-5 · Cited by 15,104
Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries
Barro, R. (1989) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3120 · Cited by 8,385
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?
Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399555954 · Cited by 7,879
(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.6.i · Cited by 7,220
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Kuznets, S. (2024) · Business Cycle Theory, Part I Volume 4 · doi:10.4324/9781003549741-8 · Cited by 7,176
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296528 · Cited by 3,905
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061733 · Cited by 3,748
Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?
Rodrik, D. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250038 · Cited by 3,152
Cited by
Government size, composition, volatility and economic growth
Afonso, A., & Furceri, D. (2010) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.02.002 · Cited by 572
Spinning gold: The financial returns to stakeholder engagement
Henisz, W. J., Dorobantu, S., & Nartey, L. J. (2014) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2180 · Cited by 546
Endogenous Political Institutions
Aghion, P., Alesina, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553041382148 · Cited by 503
Woo, J., Kumar, M. S., JWoo@imf.org, & MKumar@imf.org (2010) · IMF Working Papers · doi:10.5089/9781455201853.001 · Cited by 485
Policy Volatility, Institutions, and Economic Growth
Fatás, A., & Mihov, I. (2013) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00265 · Cited by 366
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Fatas, A., & Mihov, I.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2003-11-01
- Volume
- 118
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1419-1447
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2123016516
- Cited by
- 766
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 66.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.