The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets
Open accessAbstract
This paper studies large private banks in 21 major emerging markets in the 1990s. It first demonstrates that bank failures are very common in these coun-tries: about 25 percent of these banks failed during the seven-year sample period. The paper also shows that political concerns play a significant role in delaying government interventions to failing banks. Failing banks are much less likely to be taken over by the government or to lose their licenses before elections than after. This result is robust to controlling for macroeconomic and bank-specific factors, a new party in power, early elections, outstanding loans from the IMF, as well as country-specific, time-independent factors. This finding implies that much of the within-country clustering in emerging market bank failures is directly due to political concerns. I.
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Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model
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Cited by
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
FACCIO, M., MASULIS, R. W., & McCONNELL, J. J. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.x · Cited by 2,561
Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets
DINC, I. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.011 · Cited by 1,237
Self-citationToo many to fail—An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies
Acharya, V. V., & Yorulmazer, T. (2007) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2006.06.001 · Cited by 729
Cross-Country Empirical Studies of Systemic Bank Distress: A Survey
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2005) · National Institute Economic Review · doi:10.1177/002795010519200108 · Cited by 453
Overcoming Institutional Voids: A Reputation‐Based View of Long‐Run Survival
Gao, C., Zuzul, T., Jones, G., & Khanna, T. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2649 · Cited by 408
Metadata
- Authors
- Brown, C. O., & Dinc, I. S.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-11-01
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1413-1444
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W1993116763
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 12.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.