The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?
Abstract
What determines the allocative efficiency of markets? Why are double auctions, even with untrained human traders, allocationally efficient? We provide a simple explanation for these complex phenomena by showing how externally observable rules that define a market cause high allocative efficiency when individuals remain within the confines of these rules. We also show how the oft-ignored shape of extramarginal demand and supply affects efficiency by influencing the inverse relationship between the magnitude of efficiency loss and its probability.
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Cites
Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory
Becker, G. S. (1962) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258584 · Cited by 1,156
Behavior of Trading Automata in a Computerized Double Auction Market
Rust, J., Miller, J. H., & Palmer, R. (2018) · The Double Auction Market Institutions, Theories, and Evidence · doi:10.4324/9780429492532-8 · Cited by 60
Cited by
Experimental research in financial accounting
Libby, R., Bloomfield, R., & Nelson, M. W. (2002) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/s0361-3682(01)00011-3 · Cited by 1,201
Bounded rationality in social science: Today and tomorrow
Simon, H. A. (2000) · Mind & Society · doi:10.1007/bf02512227 · Cited by 584
Chapter 16 Agent-Based Computational Economics: A Constructive Approach to Economic Theory
Tesfatsion, L. (2006) · Handbook of Computational Economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0021(05)02016-2 · Cited by 491
Davidson, S., De Filippi, P., & Potts, J. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2744751 · Cited by 308
Control and Assurance in E-Commerce: Privacy, Integrity, and Security at Ebay
Duh, R.-R., Sunder, S., & Jamal, K. (2002) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.350663 · Cited by 55
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Gode, D. K., & Sunder, S.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-05-01
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 603-630
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2087921975
- Cited by
- 188
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 4.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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