Behavior of Trading Automata in a Computerized Double Auction Market
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This chapter reports the results of a series of tournaments held at the Santa Fe Institute beginning in March, 1990 in which computer programs played the roles of buyers and sellers in a synchronized double auction (DA) market. It shows that despite the decentralized nature of the trading process and traders&s; incomplete information about supply and demand, transaction-price trajectories for a heterogeneous collection of computer programs typically converged to the competitive equilibrium, resulting in allocations that were nearly 100% efficient. The discretization of time was adopted to simplify the programming of trading strategies and improve the synchronization of communications between players and the monitor in a multiprocessing or network-computing environment where delays may vary from player to player and moment to moment. The chapter shows that a very simple trading strategy is a highly effective and robust performer in synchronized double auction markets.
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Cites
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Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 · Cited by 2,504
Cited by
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Technology and liquidity provision: The blurring of traditional definitions
Hasbrouck, J., & Saar, G. (2008) · Journal of Financial Markets · doi:10.1016/j.finmar.2008.06.002 · Cited by 308
What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?
Gode, D. K., & Sunder, S. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555307 · Cited by 188
Rational behavior and economic theory
Vriend, N. J. (1996) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(95)00063-1 · Cited by 187
High-performance bidding agents for the continuous double auction
Tesauro, G. J., & Das, R. (2001) · ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC) · doi:10.1145/501158.501183 · Cited by 148
Metadata
- Authors
- Rust, J., Miller, J. H., & Palmer, R.
- ORCID
- Miller, John H.
- Venue
- The Double Auction Market Institutions, Theories, and Evidence
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2018-05-04
- Pages
- 155-198
- OpenAlex
- W1601386626
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 10.35
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- double auction, trading strategies, competitive equilibrium, market efficiency, decentralized trading, incomplete information, time discretization, synchronization
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Behavior of Trading Automata in a Computerized Double Auction Market. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.4324/9780429492532-8
- The paper
- Rust, J., Miller, J. H., & Palmer, R. (2018). Behavior of Trading Automata in a Computerized Double Auction Market. The Double Auction Market Institutions, Theories, and Evidence. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429492532-8
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.