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Favoritism Under Social Pressure
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the effect of nonmonetary incentives on behavior, in particular with the study of social pressure as a determinant of corruption. We offer empirical evidence that shows how professional soccer referees favor home teams in order to satisfy the crowds in the stadium. Referees have discretion over the addition of extra time at the end of a soccer game to compensate for lost time due to unusual stoppages. We find that referees systematically favor home teams by shortening close games where the home team is ahead, and lengthening close games where the home team is behind. They show no such bias for games that are not close. We further find that when the rewards for winning games increase, referees change their bias accordingly. Lastly, we identify that the mechanism through which bias operates is to satisfy the crowd, by documenting how the size and composition of the crowd affect referee favoritism.
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Citations
Cited by
Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field
DellaVigna, S. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.315 · Cited by 2,365
Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving
DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., & Malmendier, U. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr050 · Cited by 1,080
Home advantage and mispricing in indoor sports’ ghost games: the case of European basketball
De Angelis, L., & Reade, J. J. (2023) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/s10479-022-04950-7 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Garicano, L., Palacios-Huerta, I., & Prendergast, C.
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2005-05
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 208-216
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W3123987311
- Cited by
- 392
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 20.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Garicano, L., Palacios-Huerta, I., & Prendergast, C. (2005). Favoritism Under Social Pressure. Review of Economics and Statistics. https://doi.org/10.1162/0034653053970267
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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