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A Drawback of Electoral Competition
Abstract
In most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters. We provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties. In our model, the larger the number of parties, the greater the inefficiency of the outcome of electoral competition. The reason is that, when the number of parties increases, electoral incentives push each party to focus its electoral promises on a narrower constituency, and then special interest policies replace more efficient policies that have diffuse benefits. The analysis provides a possible explanation for the existence of institutional features that limit the extent of electoral competition: thresholds of exclusion, runoff electoral systems, and majoritarian two-party political systems.
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Citations
Cited by
A Political Theory of Populism *
Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs077 · Cited by 475
Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US
BESLEY, T., PERSSON, T., & STURM, D. M. (2010) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2010.00606.x · Cited by 412
Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (2007) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00006019 · Cited by 359
The arsenal of democracy: Production and politics during WWII
Rhode, P. W., Snyder, Jr., & Strumpf, K. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.08.010 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Lizzeri, A., & Persico, N.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-12-01
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1318-1348
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W1970416027
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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