The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft
Open accessAbstract
While decisionmakers warn about the cyber threat constantly, there is little systematic analysis of the issue from an international security studies perspective. Some scholars presume that the related technology's scientific complexity and methodological issues prohibit orderly investigation; only a minimum degree of technical acuity is needed, however, revealing the scope of maneuver in the cyber domain. Other skeptics argue that the cyber peril is overblown, contending that cyber weapons have no intrinsic capacity for violence and do not alter the nature or means of war. This view misses the essence of the danger and conceals its true significance: the new capability is expanding the range of possible harm and outcomes between the concepts of war and peace—with important implications for national and international security. The cyber domain, moreover, features enormous defense complications and dangers to strategic stability: offense dominance, attribution difficulties, technological volatility, poor strategic depth, escalatory ambiguity, and proliferation to nontraditional and subversive actors. But even if the cyber danger is overstated, the issue merits serious scholarly attention. Whatever the current cyber revolution signifies, it is detrimental to the intellectual progress and policy relevance of the field to continue to avoid its central questions.
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Cyber capabilities, by blurring the lines between war and peace given the increased potential for nonlethal attacks, could widen the scope of war.
“Cyber capabilities, by blurring the lines between war and peace given the increased potential for nonlethal attacks, could widen the scope of war (Kello 2013).”
From Do Emerging Military Technologies Matter for International Politics? (2020) · cites this paper as Kello 2013
The ability of cyber tools to generate economic harm and disrupt military networks could have significant second-order consequences, especially given the ease of access many actors could have to these tools, as well as challenges surrounding attribution of cyber attacks.
“Moreover, the ability of cyber tools to generate economic harm and disrupt military networks could have significant second-order consequences, especially given the ease of access many actors could have to these tools, as well as challenges surrounding attribution of cyber attacks (Kello 2013).”
From Do Emerging Military Technologies Matter for International Politics? (2020) · cites this paper as Kello 2013
Cites
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Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School
Hansen, L., & Nissenbaum, H. (2009) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00572.x · Cited by 530 · see citing works
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The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction
Lindsay, J. R. (2015) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00189 · Cited by 183 · see citing works
The hidden threat of cyber-attacks – undermining public confidence in government
Shandler, R., & Gomez, M. A. (2023) · Journal of Information Technology & Politics · doi:10.1080/19331681.2022.2112796 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
Do Emerging Military Technologies Matter for International Politics?
Horowitz, M. C. (2020) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032725 · Cited by 73 · see citing works
- Authors
- Kello, L.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kello, Lucas
- ORCID
- Kello, Lucas
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2013-10
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 7-40
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2048627029
- Cited by
- 234
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 47 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 6
- FWCI
- 55.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- International Security (publishedVersion)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Keywords
- cyber warfare, cyber weapons, strategic stability, attribution, statecraft
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