The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?
Open accessAbstract
Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to “starve the Leviathan” to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation: Procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in more corrupt democracies.
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Cites
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Frankel, J. (2010) · doi:10.3386/w15836 · Cited by 655
Public debt and economic growth: Is there a causal effect?
Panizza, U., & Presbitero, A. F. (2014) · Journal of Macroeconomics · doi:10.1016/j.jmacro.2014.03.009 · Cited by 630
The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default
Panizza, U., Sturzenegger, F., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.3.651 · Cited by 559
Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries: Truth or Fiction?
Ilzetzki, E., & Vegh, C. (2008) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w14191 · Cited by 476
On graduation from fiscal procyclicality
Frankel, J. A., Vegh, C. A., & Vuletin, G. (2013) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.07.001 · Cited by 448
Metadata
- Authors
- Alesina, A., Campante, F. R., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-09
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1006-1036
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- 1542-4774
- OpenAlex
- W3121484289
- Cited by
- 754
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 102.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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