Deconstructing Deep Active Inference: A Contrarian Information Gatherer
Open accessAbstract
Active inference is a theory of perception, learning, and decision making that can be applied to neuroscience, robotics, psychology, and machine learning. Recently, intensive research has been taking place to scale up this framework using Monte Carlo tree search and deep learning. The goal of this activity is to solve more complicated tasks using deep active inference. First, we review the existing literature and then progressively build a deep active inference agent as follows: we (1) implement a variational autoencoder (VAE), (2) implement a deep hidden Markov model (HMM), and (3) implement a deep critical hidden Markov model (CHMM). For the CHMM, we implemented two versions, one minimizing expected free energy, CHMM[EFE] and one maximizing rewards, CHMM[reward]. Then we experimented with three different action selection strategies: the ε-greedy algorithm as well as softmax and best action selection. According to our experiments, the models able to solve the dSprites environment are the ones that maximize rewards. On further inspection, we found that the CHMM minimizing expected free energy almost always picks the same action, which makes it unable to solve the dSprites environment. In contrast, the CHMM maximizing reward keeps on selecting all the actions, enabling it to successfully solve the task. The only difference between those two CHMMs is the epistemic value, which aims to make the outputs of the transition and encoder networks as close as possible. Thus, the CHMM minimizing expected free energy repeatedly picks a single action and becomes an expert at predicting the future when selecting this action. This effectively makes the KL divergence between the output of the transition and encoder networks small. Additionally, when selecting the action down the average reward is zero, while for all the other actions, the expected reward will be negative. Therefore, if the CHMM has to stick to a single action to keep the KL divergence small, then the action down is the most rewarding. We also show in simulation that the epistemic value used in deep active inference can behave degenerately and in certain circumstances effectively lose, rather than gain, information. As the agent minimizing EFE is not able to explore its environment, the appropriate formulation of the epistemic value in deep active inference remains an open question.
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Claims the paper makes
33 of 40 cited sources checked · 19 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Findingcitation
The DAI_VPG agent is able to solve the CartPole environment.
“DAI V P G is able to solve the CartPole environment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Millidge (2020) source
- Interpretationreasoning
In DAI_FA, clamping the first element of the mean and variance vectors predicted by the encoder is likely to push the variational posterior further from the true posterior.
“However, clamping the value of the first element of the mean and variance vectors predicted by the encoder is likely to push the variational posterior further from the true posterior.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Ueltzhöffer (2018) source
Methods (pp. 12–16) describes an inference network and says that minimizing free energy improves the variational density’s approximation of the true posterior. Discussion (p. 30) describes hardcoding a prior on the first latent dimension. Neither passage addresses clamping the encoder’s predicted mean and variance or whether doing so worsens the posterior approximation; searches for clamping and the first dimension found no such statement. (LLM, conf=0.73)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Interpretationcitation
In DAI_FA, clamping the first latent dimension to the target x position effectively propels the agent towards the target location.
“This effectively propels the agent towards the target location.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Ueltzhöffer (2018) source
- Findingcitation
The DAI_MC agent solves the dSprites environment.
“Nonetheless, DAI M C solves the dSprites environment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Fountas et al (2020) source
- Premisecitation
Rood et al.'s variational auto-encoder accounts for results observed in the rubber-hand illusion experiment.
“Rood et al (2020) proposes a variational auto-encoder (VAE), which is able to account for results that were observed in the context of the rubber-hand illusion (RHI) experiment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Rood et al (2020) source
- Interpretationreasoning
In the DAI_POMDP context, the mean squared error and the KL divergence between state densities are not necessarily equivalent.
“That is, in this context, the MSE and the KL-divergence between the densities over state are not necessarily equivalent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites van der Himst and Lanillos (2020) source
- Interpretationreasoning
As a result, the DAI_POMDP agent may not always follow the free energy principle.
“As a result, the DAI P OM DP agent may not always follow the free energy principle.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites van der Himst and Lanillos (2020) source
The Deep Active Inference Model section (pp. 2–4) describes the agent as optimizing variational free energy and expecting to act to minimize expected free energy, using approximations to do so. It does not say whether the POMDP agent sometimes fails to follow the free energy principle; searches for such a limitation found no passage addressing it. (LLM, conf=0.70)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Findingcitation
The distribution predicted by the DAI_POMDP encoder network does not have an identity covariance matrix.
“However, the distribution predicted by the encoder network does not have an identity covariance matrix.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites van der Himst and Lanillos (2020) source
- Premisecitation
The DAI_HR papers propose a free energy minimization scheme based on a single decoder network used to control Nao, TIAGo, and iCub robots.
“Briefly, those papers propose a free energy minimization scheme based on a single decoder network, which is used to control Nao, TIAGo, and iCub robots, respectively.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 3 sources checked- cites Sancaktar et al (2020) source
- cites Lanillos et al (2020) source
- cites Oliver et al (2019) source
The abstract (p. 1) says the paper implements free-energy-based active inference on the iCub, supporting the iCub part of the respectively ordered claim. The free-energy optimization section (p. 3) describes a forward model of the arm, not a single decoder network; the technical challenges section (p. 8) says learned generative functions could replace forward kinematics. This source therefore does not support the attributed decoder-network detail. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
The target G-value equation is an application of Bellman's equation to the expected free energy.
“Note, the above Equation is an application of Bellman's equation (Bellman, 1952) to the expected free energy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Bellman, 1952 source
- Premisecitation
State prediction error and KL divergence over states are different quantities, equal only when the two state densities are Gaussian with identity covariance.
“However, the state prediction error and the KL-divergence over states are two different quantities, which are only equal when the two densities over states are Gaussian distributions with identity covariance matrix.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites van der Himst and Lanillos (2020) source
In §2 (p. 3), the paper distinguishes its implemented state-prediction error—mean-squared error between encoded and predicted states—from KL divergence over state densities. It does not state that the quantities are equal when both densities are Gaussian with identity covariance, or that this is the only condition for equality. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Interpretationcitation
Investigations of the expected free energy commonly used in deep active inference indicate that degenerate behaviour can arise from it in certain situations.
“our investigations of the expected free energy often used in deep active inference (Fountas et al, 2020), suggests that degenerate behaviour can arise from it, in certain situations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Fountas et al, 2020 source
- Interpretationreasoning
This conceptual problem affects current deep active inference methods, including Fountas et al (2020).
“This is a conceptual issue, associated with current deep active inference approaches, such as Fountas et al (2020).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Fountas et al (2020) source
- Findingown data
In simulation, the epistemic value used in deep active inference can behave degenerately and in some circumstances lose rather than gain information.
“We also show in simulation that the epistemic value used in deep active inference can behave degenerately and in certain circumstances, effectively lose, rather than gain, information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the experiments, the models that solved the dSprites environment were those maximizing rewards.
“According to our experiments, the models able to solve the dSprites environment are the ones that maximize rewards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
With higher precision ψ, the performances of CHMM[reward] and CHMM[EFE] grow more alike.
“as ψ increases the CHMM[reward]and CHMM[EFE] performance becomes more similar.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
In the tabular experiment, the epistemic value decreases as the likelihood becomes more uniform, that is, as the true posterior becomes more similar to the approximate posterior.
“The left-most graph of Figure 14 shows that the epistemic value decreases as the likelihood becomes more uniform, i.e., the epistemic value decreases as the true posterior P (s τ |o τ ) becomes more similar to the approximate posterior Q(s τ |π).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The variational auto-encoder agent learned a useful latent representation of the task.
“First, we produced a variational auto-encoder agent that takes random actions.This agent was able to learn a useful (latent) representation of the task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
With ε-greedy action selection, only the reward-maximizing agent solved the task.
“When the epsilon-greedy algorithm was used, only the agent maximizing reward was able to solve the task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
When information gain is small compared with reward, CHMM[EFE] and CHMM[reward] behave identically.
“as the information gain becomes small w.r.t. the reward term, the CHMM[EFE] and CHMM[reward] converge to the same behaviour.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The CHMM using ε-greedy action selection performs better than the CHMM that selects the best action according to the critic.
“Also, by comparing Figures 11(a) and 11(c), it becomes clear that the CHMM using an ε-greedy algorithm performs better than the CHMM selecting the best action according to the critic.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
HMM and CHMM agents show higher VFE than the VAE.
“the HMM and CHMM have a higher VFE than the VAE.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingnone given
The EFE-minimizing CHMM failed to solve the task under every action selection strategy tested.
“Importantly, the CHMM minimizing EFE was unable to solve the task independently of the action selection strategy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Like the simpler CHMM[EFE], the DCHMM did not solve the task.
“similarly to the simpler version, i.e., the CHMM[EFE], it failed to solve the task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
With best action selection, the reward-maximizing CHMM performed as well as PPO.
“Moreover, when using best action selection, the CHMM maximizing reward performed as well as PPO, but had higher variance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
By 500K training iterations, every agent could generate images or image sequences properly.
“After 500K training iterations, all the agents were able to properly generate images or sequences of images”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
A CHMM that maximizes reward and selects actions via softmax sampling is unable to solve the task.
“The CHMMs that maximizes reward and uses softmax sampling for action selection, cannot solve the task”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
They establish a baseline reward level for random play in dSprites.
“gives us a baseline for the amount of rewards obtained under random play in the dSprites environment.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
With ε-greedy action selection, the reward-maximizing CHMM outperformed the other models.
“The CHMM maximizing reward outperformed the other models when using ε-greedy action selection, but was unable to solve the task with softmax action selection.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A mere 1% addition of information gain is sufficient to sharply lower the agent's total accumulated reward.
“even adding 1% of the information gain is enough to drastically reduce the total reward aggregated by the agent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
With softmax action selection, the reward-maximizing CHMM was unable to solve the task.
“The CHMM maximizing reward outperformed the other models when using ε-greedy action selection, but was unable to solve the task with softmax action selection.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
CHMM[reward]'s performance declined as ψ rose.
“the CHMM[reward] performance decreased as ψ increased”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
The expected-free-energy-based estimate used by the critic was not empirically fruitful.
“As will be discussed later in this paper, this estimate of the EFE was not very fruitful empirically.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The variational auto-encoder agent was unable to solve the task because it takes random actions.
“However, since the agent takes random actions, it was unable to solve the task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Adding as little as 1% of the information gain to the objective sharply reduces the reward collected.
“As shown in Figure 12, adding even 1% of the information gain already dramatically decreases the amount of reward gathered.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For the reward-maximizing CHMM, the entropy of the prior over actions stayed well above zero.
“Also, as shown in Figure 13(d), the entropy of the prior over actions remained a lot higher than zero.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Adding epistemic value to the planning objective appears to severely impair the agent's ability to explore and gather information.
“adding epistemic value to our planning objective seems to have such a damaging impact on the agent's capacity to explore its environment and gain information.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the EFE-minimizing agent, the entropy of the action prior rapidly approaches zero.
“Figure13(b)shows that the entropy of the prior over actions very quickly converges to zero.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The EFE-minimizing agent learns to choose almost only the down action.
“Figure13(a)shows that the agent minimizing EFE learn to select almost exclusively the action down”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
With best action selection, the reward-maximizing CHMM showed higher variance than PPO.
“Moreover, when using best action selection, the CHMM maximizing reward performed as well as PPO, but had higher variance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
With best action selection, only the reward-maximizing agent solved the task.
“Lastly, when selecting the best action, only the reward maximizing agent was able to solve the task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The hidden Markov model agent was unable to solve the task.
“The agent was able to learn a good represenation of the task and of its dynamics, but was not able to solve the task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
With softmax sampling, all the agents failed to solve the task.
“When softmax sampling was used, all the agents failed to solve the task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
The CHMM that minimizes EFE could not solve the task.
“the CHMM minimizing EFE was unable to solve the task”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The two CHMMs differed only in the epistemic value, which aims to make the transition and encoder network outputs close.
“The only difference between those two CHMMs is the epistemic value, which aims to make the outputs of the transition and encoder networks as close as possible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The expected free energy definition in the MDP setting does not decompose into extrinsic and intrinsic terms as in the POMDP setting.
“Importantly, this definition for the expected free energy does not decompose into extrinsic and intrinsic terms as in (13).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Costa et al (2022)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationown data
The agent minimizing expected free energy was not able to explore its environment.
“As the agent minimizing EFE is not able to explore its environment, the appropriate formulation of the epistemic value in deep active inference remains an open question.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Repeatedly choosing one action made the KL divergence between the transition and encoder network outputs small.
“This effectively makes the KL divergence between the output of the transition and encoder networks small.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If the CHMM must stick to a single action to keep the KL divergence small, then the action down is the most rewarding.
“Therefore, if the CHMM has to stick to a single action to keep the KL divergence small, then the action down is the most rewarding.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Comparing the VFE and EFE definitions reveals an inconsistency: parameters are treated as latent variables in EFE but as neural network parameters in VFE.
“By comparing the VFE in (11) and the EFE in (7), one can see an inconsistency.Namely, the parameters are seen as latent variables in the EFE definition, c.f., θ in (7), but they are regarded as parameters of neural networks in the VFE, c.f., θ s and θ o in 11.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: A variable cannot be both a parameter and a random variable, and if it is a random variable its probability density must be defined.
- Interpretationnone given
No fully complete implementation of deep active inference had been published at the time of the review.
“We argue that while all these approaches illuminate important issues associated with realizing a deep active inference agent, a fully complete implementation 2 has not yet been published.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A random agent's expected total reward is negative.
“Thus, a random agent is expected to gather a negative amount of reward.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Predicting the negative expected future reward makes the critic's task identical to that of the DQN Q-network, except that the Q-network receives observations while the critic receives hidden states.
“which is effectively making the job of the critic identical to the job of the Q-network in the DQN agent.More precisely, they are identical, except for the fact that the Q-network is taking observations as input, while the critic takes hidden states.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The expected free energy of Equation 28 can be approximated by the KL divergence between the transition network's predicted next-state distribution and the variational posterior, minus a precision-scaled reward term.
“As shown in Appendix A, Equation 28 can be approximated as follows:”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
DAI SSM is an offline method: its model is first trained on a fixed dataset collected either through random actions or through manual control of the robot, after which actions are chosen by estimating expected free energy over imaginary rollouts.
“Importantly, DAI SSM is an offline approach meaning that the model is trained first on a fixed dataset gathered either by taking random actions in the environment or by manually controlling the robot.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites C ¸atal et al, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
If the state prior and approximate posterior differ, the joint P(o|s)Q(s|π) resembles the approximate posterior more than the true posterior.
“the joint distribution P (o τ |s τ )Q(s τ |π) will be more similar to the approximate posterior Q(s τ |π) than it is to the true posterior P (s τ |o τ ).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The HMM and CHMM have higher VFE because their objective includes two KL divergences and two negative log-likelihood terms rather than one.
“This is because the VFE of the HMM and CHMM agents is composed of two KL divergences and two negative log-likelihood instead of one.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The only difference between the EFE-minimizing CHMM and the reward-maximizing CHMM is the information gain, defined as the KL divergence between the outputs of the transition and encoder networks.
“Note, the only difference between the CHMM minimizing EFE and the one maximizing reward is the information gain (see Equation 28), which is defined as the KL divergence between the output of the transition and encoder networks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
With an almost uniform likelihood, the true posterior nearly equals the state prior.
“as the likelihood is almost uniform, the true posterior P (s τ |o τ ) will be almost equal to the prior over states P (s τ ).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Since the joint resembles the approximate posterior, it is large when the approximate posterior is large and the true posterior is smaller.
“as the joint is similar to the approximate posterior, it means that the joint distribution is large when the approximate posterior is large and the true posterior is smaller.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If the CHMM must commit to a single action to keep the KL divergence small, then down is the best action available to it, since down has the highest expected reward.
“Thus, if the CHMM has to stick to a single action to keep the KL divergence small, then the best action it can choose is down, i.e., action down has the highest expected reward.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Maximizing epistemic value promotes exploration and information-gathering behaviour.
“Thus, maximizing epistemic value will promote exploration and information gain.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Conclusions drawn from the tabular experiments about epistemic value carry over to the deep active inference agents.
- Interpretationreasoning
A random agent's expected reward for crossing the bottom border is zero.
“Thus on average the agent will receive zero reward when crossing the bottom border.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The joint P(o|s)Q(s|π) resembles the approximate posterior more than the true posterior.
“the joint distribution P (o τ |s τ )Q(s τ |π) will be more similar to Q(s τ |π) than it is to P (s τ |o τ )”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Because the expected free energy is minimized, the outputs of the transition and encoder networks must be made as close as possible to each other.
“Since the EFE is minimized, the output of those two networks need to be as close as possible to each other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductown data
These results indicate that the implementation is correct.
“These results suggest that our implementation is correct”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
The epistemic value is larger when the true posterior and the approximate posterior differ more.
“This behaviour is to be expected, as the epistemic value is bigger when the true posterior P (s τ |o τ ) and the approximate posterior Q(s τ |π) are more different.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
The deep CHMM is a complete implementation of active inference.
“The resulting model is called a deep CHMM and represents a complete implementation of active inference, c.f., Figure 5.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If the likelihood becomes uniform, the true posterior over states becomes equal to the prior over states.
“Note, if the likelihood becomes uniform, then the true posterior P (s τ |o τ ) becomes equal to the prior over states P (s τ ), i.e.,”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The joint distribution tends to be large when the expectation's difference is negative.
“the joint distribution P (o τ |s τ )Q(s τ |π) will tend to be large when the difference within the expectation is negative”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
For a random agent, crossing the bottom border on the left and right sides is equally likely.
“a random agent is as likely to cross the bottom border on the right and left side of the image.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The constant's removal leaves the latent representation unchanged, since gradients do not pass through the encoder.
“removing the constant does not influence the latent representation as the gradients are not allowed to flow through the encoder, i.e., only the critic weights are updated when minimizing EFE.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given
Tabular active inference factorizes the variational distribution to include Q(s τ |π).
“In the tabular version of active inference, the variational distribution is composed of a factor Q(s τ |π).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
For EFE to equal the expected VFE, Q(s t+1|a t) must be a factor of the variational distribution.
“for the expected free energy to be the expectation of the variational free energy, Q(s t+1 |a t ) should be a factor of the variational distribution.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
Deep active inference, however, omits that factor from the variational distribution.
“However, in the deep active inference literature, the variational distribution does not contain such a factor.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Tabular active inference allows agent preferences to be linked to reinforcement learning rewards.
“In the tabular version of active inference, the preferences of the agent can be related to the rewards from the reinforcement learning literature.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Costa et al (2022)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Instead, maximizing epistemic value favors concentrating on one action, as Figure 13 shows.
“In fact, it will recommend a strong focus on a single action as was observed in Figure 13.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Maximizing epistemic value does not encourage exploration.
“Thus, maximizing epistemic value will not promote exploration.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 41
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 26
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe DAI_HR approaches cannot be considered complete implementations of deep active inference because they are restricted to a single decoder and lack encoder, transition, and critic networks.
“Since, Sancaktar et al (2020); Lanillos et al (2020); Oliver et al (2019) restricted themself to the context of a single decoder, this approach can not be considered as a complete implementation of deep active inference.More precisely, the encoder, transition and critic (or policy) networks are missing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 3 sources checked- cites Sancaktar et al (2020) source
Section 3.2 (p. 5) describes a convolutional decoder as the visual generative model, and Section 6 (p. 12) says actions are generated without learning an explicit policy. These passages support the architectural description, but the paper does not say that the absence of encoder, transition, and critic networks makes its approach an incomplete implementation of deep active inference. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Lanillos et al (2020) source
Section 2.3.2 (p. 4) describes a learned visual generative model implemented with a Mixture Density Network, supporting the description of a single learned decoder-like network. Section 2.3.1 (p. 3) describes inference and dynamics, but the paper does not assess whether its approach is a complete implementation of deep active inference or state that encoder, transition, and critic networks are required. That assessment is the citing authors’ own characterization. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Oliver et al (2019) source
The Technical Challenges section (p. 8) describes generative functions computed from forward kinematics, but does not characterize the implementation as a single decoder. The passages on the computational model and conclusions (pp. 5, 8) do not address encoder, transition, or critic networks. I searched for those network terms and for deep active inference; our copy does not establish the architectural claim attributed to Oliver et al. (LLM, conf=0.72)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Rests on an assumption: A complete implementation of deep active inference requires encoder, transition, and critic or policy networks.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe DAI_FA requires the modeller to encode prior preferences within the distributions predicted by the encoder and transition network, which can limit its applicability.
“Third, the DAI F A requires the modeller to encode the prior preferences within the distributions predicted by the encoder and transition network.This can limit the applicability of the approach.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Ueltzhöffer (2018) source
Methods (p. 14) says the modeller must specify prior expectations, and Discussion and Outlook (p. 30) describes hardcoding them as explicit prior distributions on the first dimension of the latent space as “ad-hoc and restricted.” This supports the claimed limitation, but the paper does not say that preferences must be encoded within distributions predicted by both the encoder and transition network. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe DAI_FA approach unrolls the POMDP over time, building a large computational graph for each action-perception cycle, making it computationally intensive and potentially intractable for long horizons.
“Second, this approach unrolls the partially observable Markov decision process over time.In other words, the code builds a huge computational graph containing the encoder, decoder, transition and policy networks for each action-perception cycle.Therefore, the approach is computationally intensive and can become intractable for a large time horizon.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Ueltzhöffer (2018) source
The Methods describe a discrete-time recurrent model that carries information between timesteps (p. 7), supporting the temporal part of the claim. They do not describe a huge computational graph or say that long horizons become intractable. Instead, the Methods call the implementation fast (p. 14), and the Results report modest memory use for the tested run (p. 21). (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationIn DAI_FA, clamping the first element of the mean and variance vectors predicted by the transition is uncontentious because it is simply how the generative model is defined.
“Note, clamping the value of the first element of the mean and variance vectors predicted by the transition is uncontentious, i.e., this is simply how the generative model is defined.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Ueltzhöffer (2018) source
The Methods (p. 11) describe a Gaussian state transition whose means and standard deviations are calculated by neural networks. The passage does not address clamping the first element of either vector or say that such clamping defines the generative model; searches for those terms found no passage that does. (LLM, conf=0.72)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe DAI_FA agent has no expected free energy and is instead trained to minimize cumulated variational free energy over time.
“First, there is no expected free energy, instead the agent is trained to minimize the cumulated variational free energy over time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Ueltzhöffer (2018) source
The Methods (p. 17) accumulate variational free energy across time steps, and the Discussion (p. 30) describes minimizing its path or time integral. But the Methods (pp. 17–18) also explicitly describe optimizing expected free energy under a population distribution over agent parameters, so the unqualified statement that there is no expected free energy is not supported. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe DAI_RHI approach cannot be considered a complete implementation of deep active inference because it is restricted to a VAE and lacks transition and critic networks.
“Since, Rood et al (2020) restricted themself to the context of a VAE, this approach cannot be considered as a complete implementation of deep active inference.More precisely, the transition and critic (or policy) networks are missing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Rood et al (2020) source
Section 2 (p. 2) describes a simplified model for the static RHI experiment, with no dynamics on the internal variables; this supports the claim that its scope is limited. But Section 2.1 (p. 4) explicitly compares a convolutional decoder with a VAE, so the approach is not restricted to a VAE. The paper does not state that missing transition and critic networks make it an incomplete implementation of deep active inference. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Rests on an assumption: A complete implementation of deep active inference requires encoder, transition, and critic or policy networks.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe expected free energy as stated in Equation (7) needs to be rearranged because it cannot be easily evaluated.
“The EFE as stated in Equation (7) needs to be re-arranged because it cannot be easily evaluated.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Champion et al (2023) source
Section 2.2.3 (p. 9) says verbatim that the EFE needs to be rearranged because it cannot be easily evaluated. It identifies the expression as Equation (2), however, not Equation (7); our copy does not establish that the two equation numbers refer to the same expression. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataAlthough Millidge's mathematics uses a POMDP formalism, the code implements a fully observable MDP without an encoder/decoder architecture.
“Although the mathematics in the paper are based on the formalism of a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), the code does not implement an encoder/decoder architecture, that is, the code implements a fully observable decision process, i.e., MDP.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Millidge (2020) source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe DAI_VPG implementation has no hidden states, which raises uncertainty about how the intrinsic value is computed.
“Now, remember that in the implementation, there is no encoder Q(s τ ) and no decoder P (o τ |s τ ).In other words, there are no hidden states s τ , raising some uncertainty about how the intrinsic value is computed.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Millidge (2020) source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe DAI_VPG implementation is a mixture of POMDP and MDP settings, with an MDP generative model and expected free energy adapted from the POMDP setting.
“Thus, (as it stands) the implementation of the DAI V P G agent is a mixture between the POMDP and MDP setting, where the generative model corresponds to an MDP, and the expected free energy is adapted from the POMDP setting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Millidge (2020) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe expected free energy formulation of Parr and Friston (2019) has become the standard definition used in deep active inference.
“The above EFE formulation was proposed by Parr and Friston (2019), and has become the typical EFE definition in deep active inference.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Parr and Friston (2019) source
The ‘Expected free energy’ section defines an EFE functional, supporting the attribution of a formulation to Parr and Friston. The Introduction says the paper revisits EFE and offers an alternative generalised formulation; our copy does not establish that its EFE definition became typical in deep active inference. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationUsing this definition of expected free energy in deep learning may account for why the CHMM minimizing EFE could not solve the task.
“The use of this definition of the expected free energy in the deep learning context may explain why the CHMM minimizing EFE was unable to solve the task”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Champion et al (2023) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe approach of Schneider et al. (2022) is framed from a reinforcement learning perspective in which the agent seeks to maximize reward.
“The last paper that we review (Schneider et al, 2022) is motivated from a reinforcement learning perspective, where the agent aims to maximize reward.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Schneider et al, 2022 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationUsing this definition of expected free energy may also account for presentational uncertainties, such as minus sign additions, in the deep active inference literature.
“may also explain some of the presentational uncertainties (e.g., additions of minus signs) found in the deep active inference literature, see Champion et al (2023) for details.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Champion et al (2023) source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSchneider et al.'s agent does not only maximize reward greedily; it also maximizes the information gain between the model parameters and the expected states and rewards.
“However, instead of greedily maximizing reward, the agent also maximizes the information gain between the model parameters and the expected states and rewards”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Schneider et al, 2022 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationUnlike the standard active inference objective, which is not Bellman-optimal for horizons longer than one step, the CHMM approach is Bellman-optimal and closely resembles sophisticated inference.
“Thus, in contrast to the standard active inference objective that is not Bellman-optimal for time horizons greater than one (Da Costa et al, 2023), our approach is Bellman-optimal and closely resembles sophisticated inference (Friston et al, 2020).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Da Costa et al, 2023 source
- cites Friston et al, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe CHMM minimizing expected free energy almost always selected the same action, which prevented it from solving dSprites.
“On further inspection, we found that the CHMM minimizing expected free energy almost always picks the same action, which makes it unable to solve the dSprites environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningFor the action down, the average reward was zero, while for all other actions the expected reward was negative.
“Additionally, when selecting the action down the average reward is zero, while for all the other actions, the expected reward will be negative.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe CHMM maximizing reward continued selecting all actions and successfully solved the task.
“In contrast, the CHMM maximizing reward, keeps on selecting all the actions, enabling it to successfully solve the task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenFor this case, the epistemic value is strongly negative.
“In this instance, the epistemic value will be strongly negative.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the second experiment, the likelihood is high-entropy and the state prior moves left to right.
“In the second experiment, the likelihood has high entropy (c.f., right-most graph in Figure 17), and the prior over states is shifting from left to right (c.f., Figure 18).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe agent using ε-greedy action selection collected the most cumulative reward and learned to solve the task fastest.
“Importantly, according to our experiments, the agent using the epsilon-greedy algorithm received the highest amount of cumulated rewards and learned to solve the task the fastest.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningBecause VAE and HMM agents act randomly, they failed the task and accumulated about -7K reward after 500K iterations.
“Since the VAE and HMM agents take random actions in the environment, the agents were unable to solve the task and accumulated a total amount of reward of around -7K (after 500K training iterations).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone givenMaximizing the epistemic objective leads to loss of information.
“maximizing the epistemic value causes information to be lost.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataOn this task DQN learns more slowly than A2C but more stably.
“In contrast, DQN has a slower but more stable learning on this task.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataA2C learns faster than DQN early on but shows a drop in performance between 180K and 280K training iterations.
“Also, A2C initially learns much faster than DQN, but suffers from a decrease in performance between 180K and 280K training iterations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe reward-maximizing CHMM keeps selecting the right and left actions, which allows it to move the shape toward the correct corner.
“In contrast, the CHMM maximizing reward, keeps on selecting the actions right and left, which enables it to drag the shape towards the appropriate corner, c.f., Figure 13(c).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataA2C and DQN reached roughly the same asymptotic reward, and PPO outperformed both of them.
“A2C and DQN obtained about the same asymptotic reward, and were outperformed by PPO.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe hidden Markov model agent learned a good representation of the task and of its dynamics.
“The agent was able to learn a good represenation of the task and of its dynamics, but was not able to solve the task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingnone givenThe definition of the expected free energy differed across the reviewed papers.
“Also, the definition of the expected free energy varied between papers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenThe authors struggled to replicate some claimed results, such as training DAI MC on the animal AI environment, and in some cases could not access the code.
“Yet, we struggled to replicate some of the results claimed, e.g.training DAI M C on the animal AI environment, and we were unable to access code in some instances.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataEvery agent minimized its variational free energy, which declined smoothly over training.
“all the agents were able to minimize their variational free energy, and the VFE smoothly decreases during training.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingown dataEpistemic value rises as the prior and true posterior grow more similar to the approximate posterior.
“The right-most graph of Figure 14 shows that the epistemic value increases as the prior P (s τ ) and therefore the true posterior P (o τ |s τ ) becomes more similar to the approximate posterior Q(s τ |π).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe top-down attention parameter omega in the DAI_MC agent is part of the model specification and is not obtained through variational inference.
“Importantly, the above expression for ω t is part of the model specification, i.e., it is not obtained through variational inference.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenThe number of terms needed to compute the prior over actions in DAI_MC grows exponentially with the planning time horizon.
“Finally, note that the number of terms required to compute the prior over actions (defined in Equation 5) grows exponentially with the time horizon of planning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe CHMM minimizing expected free energy repeatedly chose one action and became an expert at predicting the future for that action.
“Thus, the CHMM minimizing expected free energy repeatedly picks a single action, and becomes an expert at predicting the future when selecting this action.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningBuilding a VAE and a hidden Markov model before the CHMM allows validation of individual components and better localization of potential problems.
“Importantly, building a VAE and a HMM first, we can validate the implementation of individual components (i.e., encoder, decoder, and transition network), before tackling the CHMM, which represents a complete implementation of active inference.This method also allows us to better localize the source of potential problems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThe critical hidden Markov model (CHMM) is a complete implementation of active inference.
“which leads to the critical HMM (CHMM).Importantly, building a VAE and a HMM first, we can validate the implementation of individual components (i.e., encoder, decoder, and transition network), before tackling the CHMM, which represents a complete implementation of active inference.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSchneider et al. show a relationship between their objective and the expected free energy, a relationship that rests on assumptions including that states and rewards are latent variables.
“Then, the authors demonstrate the relationship between Equation 18and the expected free energy.This relationship is explained in more details in (Schneider, N.D.), and relies on the following assumptions:”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schneider, N.D.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe EFE-minimizing CHMM settles on a single action, down, and becomes highly accurate at predicting the future for that action, which keeps the KL divergence between the transition and encoder outputs small.
“This suggests that the CHMM minimizing EFE is picking a single action (down), and becomes an expert at predicting the future when selecting this action.This effectively makes the KL divergence between the output of the transition and encoder networks small.”
- Also stated in: § 6. Conclusion · plain
“Visualizing the distribution of actions selected as training progresses shows that the agent minimizing EFE almost exclusively picks action down.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 6. Conclusion · plain
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningNone of the reviewed deep active inference approaches is a complete and definitive realization of deep active inference, because they are incomplete, cannot scale to image-based tasks, or rely on restrictive assumptions.
“However, we do not feel that any of these approaches is a complete and definitive realization of deep active inference, because these approaches are either incomplete, unable to scale to image-based tasks, or make restrictive assumptions (see Section 2 for details).”
- Also stated in: § 6. Conclusion · plain
“However, we did not compare with these methods as they are either incomplete, unable to scale to image-based tasks, or make restrictive assumptions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 6. Conclusion · plain
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe information gain that is supposed to give an EFE-minimizing agent its exploratory behaviour instead prevents the agent from solving dSprites, because it reduces the agent to a single action and thus to a suboptimal policy.
“To conclude, the same information gain that is intended to give an EFE minimizing agent its exploration behaviour, also prevents the agent from solving the dSprites environment.This is because the agent is reduced to picking a single action, leading to a suboptimal policy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The dSprites environment is a suitable and informative testbed for evaluating deep active inference agents.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAn almost uniform likelihood barely affects the joint distribution, leaving the approximate posterior dominant.
“as the likelihood is almost uniform, it will not have much impact on the joint distribution P (o τ |s τ )Q(s τ |π) and the approximate posterior Q(s τ |π) will dominate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningFor every action other than down, the expected reward is negative, because a trial is interrupted after 50 action-perception cycles without crossing the bottom line and the agent then receives a reward of -1.
“For all the other actions, the expected reward will be negative because after 50 action-perception cycles without crossing the bottom line, the trial is interrupted and the agent receives a reward of -1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningIn dSprites, choosing the action down yields an average reward of zero, because shapes are equally numerous on the left and right of the image and the reward rises linearly toward a corner and is zero at the image center.
“Additionally, when selecting the action down, the average reward is zero, because (in the dSprites dataset) there are as many shapes on the left of the image as on the right, and when crossing the bottom line, the agent receives a reward which is linearly increasing (or decreasing) as a corner is approached and is zero at the center of the image.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAlternative definitions of the expected free energy exist and are likely to perform better.
“However, there are alternative definitions, which are likely to behave better (Parr et al, 2022).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Parr et al, 2022 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenThe smooth L1 loss was selected because it is less sensitive to outliers than the mean squared error.
“Note, the SL1 was picked because it is less sensitive to outliers than”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSchneider et al.'s approach is a valuable contribution to reinforcement learning for robotic control, but it is not a complete deep active inference agent.
“To conclude, this approach is a great contribution to reinforcement learning applied to robotic control, but cannot be considered as a complete deep active inference agent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
PremisereasoningUnder two Gaussian assumptions with identity covariance matrices, the KL-divergence becomes mean squared error.
“the KL-divergence reduces to the mean squared error (MSE) because of two Gaussian assumptions (with identity covariance matrices)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
Interpretationown dataIf the state prior and approximate posterior differ, the true posterior nearly equals the state prior.
“the true posterior will almost be equal to the prior over states P (s τ |o τ ) ≈ P (s τ )”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenFailing to cross the bottom line within 50 actions yields a reward of -1.
“if the agent does not cross the bottom line within the first 50 actions, it will receive a reward of -1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe deep active inference agent of Çatal et al. (2020) is built on a state space model, which is why it is named DAI SSM.
“The deep active inference agent proposed by (C ¸atal et al, 2020) is based on a state space model, and is therefore called DAI SSM .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites C ¸atal et al, 2020
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenTraining stability was improved by adding a target network, structurally identical to the critic, whose weights are synchronized with the critic's every K learning iterations.
“Also, as for the DQN agent, we improved the training stability by implementing a target network Ĝθ a , which is structurally identical to the critic and whose weights are synchronized with the weights of the critic every K (learning) iterations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe assumptions behind Schneider et al.'s derivation of expected free energy place strong constraints on the model, and the proof fails when the likelihood mappings are not delta distributions.
“Importantly, while the above assumptions allow the authors to derive the expected free energy from Equation 18, these assumptions also impose a lot of constraints on the model.For example, the proof does not hold if the likelihood mappings are not delta distributions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenWhen the critic network's predicted values are very close, an agent using softmax sampling may choose actions randomly.
“if the values predicted by the critic network are very close to each other, then an agent using softmax sampling may perform random actions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningConsequently, the log true posterior is very negative, whereas the log approximate posterior is less negative.
“This implies that the logarithm of true posterior will be very negative, while the logarithm of the approximate posterior will be less negative, i.e., closer to zero.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenAll experiments can be reproduced using code available on GitHub.
“The code that can be used to reproduce all the experiments can be found on GitHub at the following URL: https://github.com/ChampiB/Deconstructing_Deep_Active_Inference.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningBuilding the VAE and HMM agents before the CHMM validates the implementation of the individual components (encoder, decoder, transition network) and helps localize where problems arise.
“Importantly, building a VAE and a HMM first allows us to validate the implementation of individual components (i.e., encoder, decoder, and transition network), before tackling the CHMM, which represents a complete implementation of active inference.This method also allows us to better localize the source of potential problems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe CHMM that selects the best action according to the critic suffers from insufficient exploration, which slows its learning.
“Put simply, the latter suffers from a lack of exploration that slows down its learning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningDropping a constant does not change the optimal policy.
“Removing a constant does not influence which policy is the best.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenWith larger N, the estimator for Q(s t+1|a t) becomes a Gaussian mixture with N components, rendering the Equation 40 KL-divergence analytically intractable.
“for higher value of N , the estimator of Q(s t+1 |a t ) would be a mixture of Gaussian with N components, effectively rendering the KL-divergence in Equation 40analytically intractable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThis behaviour is unexpected, since epistemic value should be larger when true and approximate posteriors are more similar.
“This behaviour should not be observed, as the epistemic value is bigger when the true posterior P (s τ |o τ ) and the approximate posterior Q(s τ |π) are more similar.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenA Monte-Carlo estimate is typically employed.
“Generally, a Monte-Carlo estimate is used as follows:”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
A complete implementation of deep active inference requires encoder, transition, and critic or policy networks.
“More precisely, the transition and critic (or policy) networks are missing.”
“More precisely, the encoder, transition and critic (or policy) networks are missing.”
The paper relies on this without support.
A variable cannot be both a parameter and a random variable, and if it is a random variable its probability density must be defined.
“Note, θ cannot be both a parameter (i.e, parameter, vector, or matrix) and a random variable, and if θ is a random variable, one must define its probability density P (θ), which is missing in Equation 11.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
In active inference, observations are generated by latent states, and states depend on previous states and actions.
“Importantly, in active inference, observations o τ ∈ R #O are assumed to be generated by latent states s τ ∈ R #S , and states s τ +1 depends on the previous states s τ and actions a τ ∈ R #A .”
The paper relies on this without support.
The dSprites environment is a suitable and informative testbed for evaluating deep active inference agents.
“This environment was explored because of its use in (Fountas et al, 2020).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Conclusions drawn from the tabular experiments about epistemic value carry over to the deep active inference agents.
“This is particularly important in the deep active inference literature, which builds on this equation.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The generative model includes observed variables for states and rewards.
“the generative model contains observed variables for states o s τ and rewards o r τ”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The likelihood mappings for rewards and states are delta distributions, making latent variables fully observable except for model parameters θ, which are delta-distributed at time zero and fixed thereafter.
“the likelihood mappings, i.e., P (o r τ |r τ ) and P (o s τ |s τ ), are delta distributions which effectively make the latent variables fully observable, except for the model parameters θ that are distributed according to a delta distribution at time step zero and remain fixed over time”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The variance of the transition mapping does not depend on parameters θ; it is a diagonal matrix with equal diagonal elements σ.
“the variance of the transition mapping P (s τ +1 |s τ , a τ , θ) does not depend on the parameters θ, i.e., P (s τ +1 |s τ , a τ , θ) = N (s τ +1 ; µ, σ) where µ = f θ (s τ , a τ ) is predicted by a neural network with parameters θ, and σ = Iσ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are equal to σ.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The agent observes its own action, consistent with proprioception.
“consistent with proprioception, the agent observes its own action, i.e., o a τ -1 = a τ -1 where a τ -1 is the action performed by the agent at time τ -1.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
The critic backs up the highest future cost but selects the lowest
MajorThe target equation takes the maximum future expected-free-energy value, while the stated action rule selects the minimum. The backup therefore evaluates a different future choice from the one the agent is said to make.
“y(a t ) = G t+1 (a t ) + γE Q ϕs (s t+1 ) max a t+1 ∈A Ĝθ a (s t+1 , a t+1 ) , (26”
“select the action that minimizes EFE according to the critic, i.e., a * t = arg min at G θa (s t , a t )”
The sampling formula treats a stated variance as a standard deviation
MinorThe text defines σ as covariance-matrix diagonal entries, but multiplying unit-variance noise by σ produces diagonal covariance entries of σ2, not σ.
“where µ is the mean vector of the Gaussian distribution, and σ are the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix.”
“ŝt = µ + σ ⊙ ε, where ⊙ is an element-wise product between two vectors, and ε ∼ N (ϵ; 0, I).”
Conflicting statements about Schneider et al.'s code availability
MinorThe review gives a public URL for the Schneider et al. approach, but the conclusion says its code was not available online.
“The code of this approach is available at the following URL: https: //github.com/TimSchneider42/aerm.”
“(h) the approach by Schneider et al (2022) for which the code was not available online.”
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Computational mechanisms of curiosity and goal-directed exploration
Schwartenbeck, P., Passecker, J., Hauser, T. U., FitzGerald, T. H. B., Kronbichler, M., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.41703 · Cited by 250 · see citing works
Generalised free energy and active inference
Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-019-00805-w · Cited by 236 · see citing works
Active inference on discrete state-spaces: A synthesis
Da Costa, L., Parr, T., Sajid, N., Veselic, S., Neacsu, V., & Friston, K. (2020) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2020.102447 · Cited by 226 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Active inference is a unified framework for perception, learning, and planning that has emerged from theoretical neuroscience (Da Costa et al., 2020; Champion et al., 2021; Champion, Da Costa, et al., 2022; Champion, Bow-man, et al., 2022; Champion et al., 2022a).”
BackgroundActive inference on discrete state-spaces: A synthesis
Costa, L. D., Parr, T., Sajid, N., Veselic, S., Neacsu, V., & Friston, K. J. (2020) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · Cited by 204 · see citing works
Friston, K. J., Costa, L. D., Hafner, D., Hesp, C., & Parr, T. (2021) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01351 · Cited by 123 · see citing works
Deep active inference as variational policy gradients
Millidge, B. (2020) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2020.102348 · Cited by 115 · see citing works
Dopamine, reward learning, and active inference
FitzGerald, T. H. B., Dolan, R. J., & Friston, K. (2015) · Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncom.2015.00136 · Cited by 112 · see citing works
Ueltzhöffer, K. (2018) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-018-0785-7 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
Deep active inference agents using Monte-Carlo methods
Fountas, Z., Sajid, N., Mediano, P. A. M., & Friston, K. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2006.04176 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
End-to-End Pixel-Based Deep Active Inference for Body Perception and Action
Sancaktar, C., van Gerven, M. A. J., & Lanillos, P. (2020) · 2020 Joint IEEE 10th International Conference on Development and Learning and Epigenetic Robotics (ICDL-EpiRob) · doi:10.1109/icdl-epirob48136.2020.9278105 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
Active Inference in OpenAI Gym: A Paradigm for Computational Investigations Into Psychiatric Illness
Cullen, M., Davey, B., Friston, K. J., & Moran, R. (2018) · Biological Psychiatry Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging · doi:10.1016/j.bpsc.2018.06.010 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
Active Inference and Behavior Trees for Reactive Action Planning and Execution in Robotics
Pezzato, C., Corbato, C. H., Bonhof, S., & Wisse, M. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Robotics · doi:10.1109/tro.2022.3226144 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Learning Generative State Space Models for Active Inference
Çatal, O., Wauthier, S. T., Boom, C. D., Verbelen, T., & Dhoedt, B. (2020) · Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fncom.2020.574372 · Cited by 39 · see citing works
Robot self/other distinction: active inference meets neural networks learning in a mirror
Lanillos, P., Pages, J., & Cheng, G. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2004.05473 · Cited by 35 · cited 4× · see citing works
“In this section, we explain and discuss the following approaches: Sancaktar et al. (2020), Lanillos et al. (2020), and Oliver et al. (2019).”
BackgroundInfluentialReward maximization through discrete active inference
Da Costa, L., Sajid, N., Parr, T., Friston, K., & Smith, R. (2023) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01574 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Active inference body perception and action for humanoid robots
Oliver, G., Lanillos, P., & Cheng, G. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1906.03022 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Deep Active Inference for Partially Observable MDPs
van der Himst, O., & Lanillos, P. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2009.03622 · Cited by 27
Deep Active Inference for Partially Observable MDPs
van der Himst, O., & Lanillos, P. (2020) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-64919-7_8 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Millidge, B. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/kf6wc · Cited by 21 · see citing works
A deep active inference model of the rubber-hand illusion
Rood, T., van Gerven, M., & Lanillos, P. (2020) · Communications in Computer and Information Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-64919-7_10 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Robot Self/Other Distinction: Active Inference Meets Neural Networks Learning in a Mirror*
Lanillos, P., Pagès, J., & Gordon, C. (2020) · Frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications · doi:10.3233/faia200372 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Realizing Active Inference in Variational Message Passing: The Outcome-Blind Certainty Seeker
Champion, T., Grześ, M., & Bowman, H. (2021) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01422 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
Self-citationBranching Time Active Inference: The theory and its generality
Champion, T., Costa, L. D., Bowman, H., & Grześ, M. (2022) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2022.03.036 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Self-citationBranching time active inference: Empirical study and complexity class analysis
Champion, T., Bowman, H., & Grześ, M. (2022) · Neural Networks · doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2022.05.010 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Self-citationDeconstructing deep active inference
Champion, T., Grześ, M., Bonheme, L., & Bowman, H. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2303.01618 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Self-citationDeconstructing Deep Active InferencePreprint
Champion, T., Grześ, M., Bonheme, L., & Bowman, H. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4398264 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Self-citationReward Maximisation through Discrete Active InferencePreprint
Costa, L. D., Sajid, N., Parr, T., Friston, K., & Smith, R. (2020) · arXiv.org · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2009.08111 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Active Inference and Behavior Trees for Reactive Action Planning and Execution in RoboticsPreprint
Pezzato, C., Corbato, C. H., Bonhof, S., et al. (2020) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2011.09756 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Active Inference for Robotic Manipulation
Schneider, T., Belousov, B., Abdulsamad, H., & Peters, J. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2206.10313 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Branching Time Active Inference with Bayesian Filtering
Champion, T., Grześ, M., & Bowman, H. (2022) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01529 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Self-citationMulti-Modal and Multi-Factor Branching Time Active InferencePreprint
Champion, T., Grześ, M., & Bowman, H. (2022) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2206.12503 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Self-citationReframing the Expected Free Energy: Four Formulations and a UnificationPreprint
Champion, T., Bowman, H., Marković, D., et al. (2024) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2402.14460 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Self-citationMultimodal and Multifactor Branching Time Active Inference
Champion, T., Grześ, M., & Bowman, H. (2024) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01703 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Self-citationActive inference on discrete state-spaces: a synthesis
Costa, L. D., Parr, T., Sajid, N., et al. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2001.07203
Deep Reinforcement Learning with Double Q-learning
van Hasselt, H., Guez, A., & Silver, D. (2015) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1509.06461
End-to-End Pixel-Based Deep Active Inference for Body Perception and Action
Sancaktar, C., van Gerven, M., & Lanillos, P. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2001.05847
Flagged first, then by citations
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- Matthey, 2017, dSprites: Disentanglement testing sprites dataset
- Matthey, 2017, beta-VAE: Learning basic visual concepts with a constrained variational framework
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Matsumoto, T., Fujii, K., Murata, S., & Tani, J. (2025) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e27080846 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Prediction in action: Toward an empirical science of active inference
Lageman, J., Fahrenfort, J. J., & Slagter, H. A. (2026) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2026.106817 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Borojević, J., Haddon-Hill, G. W., Sandoval, J., & Murata, S. (2026) · IEEE/SICE International Symposium on System Integration (SII) · doi:10.1109/sii64115.2026.11404443
Sheikhbahaee, Z., Safron, A., Sakthivadivel, D. A. R., Albarracin, M., & Rish, I. (2026) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-16955-6_7
- Authors
- Champion, T., Grześ, M., Bonheme, L., & Bowman, H.
- Affiliations
- University of Birmingham (GB)
- University of Kent (GB)
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- Venue
- Neural Computation
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2024-10-11
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 2403-2445
- ISSN
- 0899-7667 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-888X
- OpenAlex
- W4401566122
- Cited by
- 5
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 1
- FWCI
- 1.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Neural Computation (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (submittedVersion)
- University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Reinforcement Learning in Robotics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Keywords
- free energy principle, variational autoencoder, epistemic value, action selection, exploration-exploitation balance, Monte Carlo tree search, expected free energy, reward maximization, Kullback-Leibler divergence
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