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Cited by 377

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Incentives for Managers and Inequality among Workers: Evidence from a Firm-Level Experiment

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Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., Rasul, I.·2007·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1162/qjec.122.2.729
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Abstract

We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of workers' productivity through two channels. First, managers respond to incentives by targeting their efforts towards more able workers, implying that both the mean and the dispersion increase. Second, managers select out the least able workers, implying that the mean increases but the dispersion may decrease. In our field experiment we find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and dispersion of worker productivity. Analysis of individual level productivity data shows that managers target their effort towards high ability workers, and the least able workers are less likely to be selected into employment. These results highlight the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and earnings inequality among lower-tier workers.

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Metadata

Authors
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2007-05-01
Volume
122
Issue
2
Pages
729-773
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1162/qjec.122.2.729
OpenAlex
W2104318064
Cited by
377
References
51
FWCI
46.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentives for Managers and Inequality among Workers: Evidence from a Firm-Level Experiment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/qjec.122.2.729
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Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2007). Incentives for Managers and Inequality among Workers: Evidence from a Firm-Level Experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.2.729

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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