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Cited by 470

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Trust and Social Collateral*

Open access
Karlan, Dean, Mobius, Markus, Rosenblat, Tanya, Szeidl, Adam·2009·Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

This paper builds a theory of trust based on informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, network connections between individuals can be used as social collateral to secure informal borrowing. We define network-based trust as the largest amount one agent can borrow from another agent and derive a reduced-form expression for this quantity, which we then use in three applications. (1) We predict that dense networks generate bonding social capital that allows transacting valuable assets, whereas loose networks create bridging social capital that improves access to cheap favors such as information. (2) For job recommendation networks, we show that strong ties between employers and trusted recommenders reduce asymmetric information about the quality of job candidates. (3) Using data from Peru, we show empirically that network-based trust predicts informal borrowing, and we structurally estimate and test our model.

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Crossref · 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.1307

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Metadata

Authors
Karlan, D., Mobius, M., Rosenblat, T., & Szeidl, A.
Venue
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2009-08
Volume
124
Issue
3
Pages
1307-1361
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W3122626903
Cited by
470
References
44
FWCI
84.67
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Trust and Social Collateral*. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.1307
The paper
Karlan, D., Mobius, M., Rosenblat, T., & Szeidl, A. (2009). Trust and Social Collateral*. Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.1307

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.