Corruption and Bilateral Trade Flows: Extortion or Evasion?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of corruption on bilateral trade flows, highlighting the dual role of corruption in terms of extortion and evasion. On one hand, corruption taxes trade, when corrupt customs officials in the importing country extort bribes from exporters (the extortion effect); on the other, if tariffs are high, corruption may be trade enhancing, when the corrupt officials allow exporters to evade tariff barriers (the evasion effect). The paper derives and estimates a corruption-augmented gravity model that shows that the effect of corruption on trade flows is ambiguous and is contingent on the level of tariffs. The predictions are borne out in the data: corruption taxes trade in the majority of cases, but in high tariff environments (covering 5-14% of the observations,) its marginal effect is trade-enhancing.
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Citations
Cites
The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity
Melitz, M. J. (2003) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00467 · Cited by 12,309 · cited 1×
“…a fixed cost of exporting to d, associated for example with the maintenance costs of distribution and service networks in the importing country (see Melitz, 2003), we can predict that an increase in the corruption tax (by reducing the potential profits to the exporter) raises the probability that…”
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839588 · Cited by 10,641
Mauro, P. (1995) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946696 · Cited by 8,820
Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle
Anderson, J. E., & van Wincoop, E. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321455214 · Cited by 7,566
Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Partners and Trading Volumes *
Helpman, E., Melitz, M., & Rubinstein, Y. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.441 · Cited by 2,436
The institutional environment for economic growth
Henisz, W. J. (2000) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/1468-0343.00066 · Cited by 1,651 · cited 3×
“results contrast sharply with earlier notions advanced by Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) that corruption can be efficiency enhancing because it removes government-imposed rigidities that impede investment and interfere with other economic decisions favorable to growth.”
InfluentialMarket access, economic geography and comparative advantage: an empirical test
Davis, D. R., & Weinstein, D. E. (2003) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(02)00088-0 · Cited by 378
Cited by
Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A. M., & Tierney, M. J. (2018) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqx052 · Cited by 410
On the role of domestic trade flows for estimating the gravity model of trade
Yotov, Y. V. (2022) · Contemporary Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/coep.12567 · Cited by 187
Income inequality and the oil resource curse
Parcero, O. J., & Papyrakis, E. (2016) · Resource and Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.06.001 · Cited by 98
CORRUPTION AND TRUST IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN SUB- SAHARAN AFRICA
(2008) · HAL · Cited by 72
Metadata
- Authors
- Dutt, P., & Traca, D.
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2010-11
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 843-860
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W3125904629
- Cited by
- 234
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 22.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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