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Cited by 35

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Preferring a Genetically-Related Child

Rulli, Tina·2016·Journal of Moral Philosophy

Abstract

Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. One could argue that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. For the sake of argument, I assume there is such a duty and focus on a pressing objection to it. Prospective parents may prefer that their children are genetically related to them. I examine eight reasons prospective parents have for preferring genetic children: for parent-child physical resemblance, for family resemblance, for psychological similarity, for the sake of love, to achieve a kind of immortality, for the genetic connection itself, to be a procreator, and to experience pregnancy. I argue that, with the possible exception of the pregnancy desire, these reasons fail to defeat a duty to adopt a child rather than create one, even assuming that we do have some leeway to favor our own interests.

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. R. Levy-Schiff, O. Bar and D. Har-Even, 'Psychological Adjustment of Adoptive Parents To-be,' pp. 258-267. 65 Ibid.
  2. Ali S. Khasan, Louise C. Kenny, Thomas M. Laursen, Uzma Mahmood, Preben B. Mortensen, Tine B. Henriksen, Keelin O'Donoghue, 'Pregnancy and the Risk of Autoimmune Disease,' ploS one 6 (2011). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019658. · DOI

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Metadata

Authors
Rulli, T.
Venue
Journal of Moral Philosophy
Published
2016-11-12
Volume
13
Issue
6
Pages
669-698
ISSN
  • 1740-4681
  • 1745-5243
Cited by
35
References
3

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