The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Limits of Morality
Abstract
This book is a sustained attack on two of the most fundamental features of ‘ordinary morality’, the common‐sense moral view that most of us accept. According to this view, morality involves two different kinds of limits. First, morality imposes certain limits on our actions, ruling out various kinds of acts – for example, harming the innocent – even if more good might be brought about by performing an act of this kind. Second, there are limits imposed on morality, limits to what morality can demand of us; in particular, we are not required to make our greatest possible contribution to the overall good. I argue that despite their intuitive appeal, neither sort of limit can be adequately defended.
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Cites
Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem
Thomson, J. J., & The Hegeler Institute (1976) · Monist · doi:10.5840/monist197659224 · Cited by 1,341
Contractualism and utilitarianism
Scanlon, T. M. (1982) · Utilitarianism and Beyond · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511611964.007 · Cited by 981
Wolf, S. (1982) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026228 · Cited by 917
Donagan, A. (1977) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226228419.001.0001 · Cited by 768
Cited by
The Oxford handbook of ethical theory
(2006) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-5825 · Cited by 732
Corporate Social Responsibility: Three Key Approaches
Windsor, D. (2006) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00584.x · Cited by 710
Aligning AI With Shared Human Values
Hendrycks, D., Burns, C., Basart, S., Critch, A., Li, J., Song, D., & Steinhardt, J. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2008.02275 · Cited by 517
Beyond sacrificial harm: a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J. (2018) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000093 · Cited by 434
A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences
Gintis, H. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000581 · Cited by 416
Metadata
- Authors
- Kagan, S.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1991-04-25
- OpenAlex
- W1537046490
- Cited by
- 637
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 58.66
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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