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Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China

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O’Brien, Kevin J., Li, Lianjiang · 2017 · Critical Readings on the Communist Party of China (4 Vols. Set)

Abstract

Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China Kevin .1. O ’Brien and Lianjiang Li A pattern of selective policy implementation has emerged in the Chinese country- side, as some cadres conscientiously enforce unpopular policies while refusing to carry out other measures that villagers welcome. Such officials often go to extraordi- nary lengths to urge community members to pay their taxes and fees, to accept cre- mation instead of burial, and to comply with birth control edicts, yet ignore or distort policies that ban unauthorized appropriation and require respect for villagers’ rights and interests. These rural leaders often violate prohibitions on the use of force, side- step limits on peasant burdens, and derail electoral reforms that are intended to improve accountability. They sometimes even turn a well—liked central policy, such as economic growth, into a harmful “local policy” that justifies wasteful investment and more extraction. Why do cadres act in this way? How do Chinese “street-level bureaucrats” define their tasks and distinguish between policies that must be imple- mented and those they can safely ignore?‘ Street—Level Discretion and Policy Delivery That grass-roots officials carry out some policies but not others is hardly news. But how much discretion street-level bureaucrats enjoy has been a matter of debate. Some analysts argue that implementors usually have limited room for maneuver because their superiors have ways to shape their preferences and constrain their behavior. Adopting a top-down approach, these researchers maintain that front—line bureaucrats mainly affect strategies for achieving goals rather than the goals them- selves. They note that skilful high-level administrators can structure implementation, reduce the number of veto points, and permit outsiders (including ordinary citizens) to oversee policy delivery. They remind us that performance evaluation remains largely in the hands of top decision makers and that, even when conditions for suc- cessful implementation are absent at first, fine-tuning may be an alternative to accommodation? Other students of bureaucracy see more opportunities for street-level discretion: they argue, in fact, that it is virtually inevitable. These researchers focus on motives that emerge from within organizations and underscore unintended consequences and perverse incentives.3 Their analysis begins by identifying networks of microlevel actors involved in policy delivery, including implementors, other oflicials, and pri- 167

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Metadata

Authors
O’Brien, K. J., & Li, L.
Venue
Critical Readings on the Communist Party of China (4 Vols. Set)
Publisher
BRILL
Published
2017-01-01
Pages
437-460
OpenAlex
W3121939112
Cited by
275
References
2
FWCI
223.49
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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O’Brien, K. J., & Li, L. (2017). Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China. Critical Readings on the Communist Party of China (4 Vols. Set). https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004302488_017

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