The DOI matches its Crossref record; 67 of the 67 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder
Open accessAbstract
Political selection is central to the survival of all regimes. This article evaluates the relative importance of performance and political connection for the advancement of local politicians under authoritarianism. We hypothesize that in a large-scale multilevel polity, economic performance plays a greater role in promotion at lower administrative levels of government than at higher ones, even after controlling for political connections. This dualist strategy allows the ruling elites to achieve economic performance while minimizing the advancement of potentially disloyal challengers. Thus, balancing between loyalty and competence among subordinates enhances regime survival. Our empirical evidence draws on a comprehensive panel dataset of provincial, prefectural, and county-level Communist party secretaries and government executives appointed between 1999 and 2007. We find consistent evidence for our argument under various model specifications. We also explore the heterogeneous effects of performance on promotion given the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) age ineligibility rule for cadre promotion and jurisdiction characteristics.
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Cites
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Kuznets, S. (2024) · Business Cycle Theory, Part I Volume 4 · doi:10.4324/9781003549741-8 · Cited by 7,176
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China
Li, H., & Zhou, L.-A. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.009 · Cited by 3,668
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development
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Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space
Henderson, J. V., Storeygard, A., & Weil, D. N. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.994 · Cited by 2,596
What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?
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“They are often short-lived and prone to coups d’état that are usually engineered by competitors who emerge from within the system (Geddes, 1999; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000).”
BackgroundDemocracy and Development: List of Tables and Figures
Przeworski, A., Álvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · Cited by 1,686
The origins of political order: from prehuman times to the French Revolution
(2011) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.49-1735 · Cited by 1,605
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007305817 · Cited by 1,523
Cited by
Jiang, J. (2018) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12394 · Cited by 413
Metadata
- Authors
- Landry, P. F., Lü, X., & Duan, H.
- Venue
- Comparative Political Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2017-09-17
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1074-1105
- ISSN
- 0010-4140 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-3829
- OpenAlex
- W3121829022
- Cited by
- 427
- References
- 67
- FWCI
- 115.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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