Patronage and Political Stability in Africa
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Abstract
Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader’s patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional change in power. This article employs ministerial appointments to the cabinet as a proxy for changes in the size of a leader’s patronage coalition. With time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that the size of cabinets varies systematically according to regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, and total population. It then shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. A proportional hazards model of regime duration indicates that cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader’s being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader’s coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.
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“This article examines a foundational paradox in the political science of democratization: electoral competition, long treated as a corrective to corruption and authoritarianism, frequently produces the opposite of its intended effects.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Arriola (2009)
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“The result is that beyond an empirically estimated optimum near the middle of the size distribution, additional appointments generate diminishing and eventually negative returns to stability.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Arriola's (2009)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Ghana has maintained cabinets in the range of 25 to 40 ministers across the post-2000 period, fluctuating around the optimum identified in Arriola's analysis.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Arriola's (2009)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Cabinets that are too small relative to the universe of potential plotters leave elite factions excluded and aggrieved, raising coup risk.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Arriola's (2009)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Cabinets that grow through inclusive coalition management initially reduce instability by buying off potential challengers with portfolios, salaries, and access to rents.”
From THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION: HOW POLITICAL OPENINGS CAN FUEL PATRONAGE AND INSTABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SIERRA LEONE, GHANA, AND KENYA (2026) · cites this paper as Arriola's (2009)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Arriola, L. R.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Corresponding author
- Arriola, Leonardo R.
- ORCID
- Arriola, Leonardo R.
- Venue
- Comparative Political Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2009-02-27
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1339-1362
- ISSN
- 0010-4140 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-3829
- OpenAlex
- W2143095085
- Cited by
- 500
- References
- 68
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 99 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 48 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 27 · 2015: 26 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 26.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Comparative Political Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › African Studies and Ethnography
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
- Keywords
- patronage, political stability, coups d'état, cabinet size, ministerial appointments, regime duration, political regimes, ethnic fractionalization, resource constraints, African politics
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