The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions
Abstract
We model foreign-aid-for-policy deals, assuming that leaders want to maximize their time in office. Their actions are shaped by two political institutions, their selectorate and winning coalition. Leaders who depend on a large coalition, a relatively small selectorate, and who extract valuable policy concessions from prospective recipients are likely to give aid. Prospective recipients are likely to get aid if they have few resources, depend on a small coalition and a large selectorate, and the policy concession sought by the donor is not too politically costly. The amount of aid received, if any, increases as the recipient leader's coalition increases, the selectorate decreases, the issue's salience increases, and the domestic resources increase. The theory explains why many Third World people hate the United States and want to live there. Empirical tests using the U.S. Agency for International Development data for the post—World War II years support the model's predictions.
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Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Heckman, J. J. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912352 · Cited by 28,779
(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.i · Cited by 15,100
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Self-citationBurnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.847 · Cited by 3,728
Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?
Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1009874203400 · Cited by 2,485
African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999
Van de Walle, N. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511800344 · Cited by 1,540
The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics
Mitra, D., & Easterly, W. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061505 · Cited by 1,493
Gleditsch, K. S. (2002) · Journal Of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/002200202236171 · Cited by 1,485
Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid
Boone, P. (1996) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00127-1 · Cited by 1,405
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
de Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2586113 · Cited by 1,044
Self-citation
Cited by
de Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309090109 · Cited by 395
Self-citationHow Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes
Wright, J. (2009) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00386.x · Cited by 372
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN LEGISLATORS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AID
MILNER, H. V., & TINGLEY, D. H. (2010) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00356.x · Cited by 293
Guo, B., Fan, V., Strange, A., & Grépin, K. A. (2024) · Health Policy and Planning · doi:10.1093/heapol/czad095 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- de Mesquita, B. B., & Smith, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2007-04
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 251-284
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2120766835
- Cited by
- 356
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 39.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
