The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation?
Abstract
The dynamic effect of government coercion on dissident activities has been a controversial issue. It is contended that this relationship is significantly altered when different control variables such as regime type, ideological orientation, and economic performance are employed. Time series data based on 24 countries is used to estimate the net effect of government coercion on two types of dissident activities: protest demonstrations and deaths from domestic group violence. It is shown that in democratic nations, government sanctions provoke a higher level of protest demonstrations. However, in nondemocratic countries, at the extreme, severe sanctions can impose an unbearable cost, resulting in an inverse relationship between sanctions and political deaths. The nature of the regime influences not only the dynamics of the relationship between government coercion and dissident activities, but also the qualitative character of opposition response.
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OLSON, M. (2009) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjsf3ts · Cited by 1,601
Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution
Kuran, T. (1989) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00116762 · Cited by 905
Johnson, C. (1982) · Stanford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781503620834 · Cited by 82
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“Draining the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare
Valentino, B., Huth, P., & Balch-Lindsay, D. (2004) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818304582061 · Cited by 676
Davenport, C. (1995) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111650 · Cited by 623
Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution
Rasler, K. (1996) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2096410 · Cited by 609
Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing
Moore, W. H. (1998) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991732 · Cited by 511
Gurr, T. R., & Moore, W. H. (1997) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2960482 · Cited by 440
Metadata
- Authors
- Gupta, D. K., Singh, H., & Sprague, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1993-06
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 301-339
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W1975809714
- Cited by
- 204
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 6.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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