The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cultural Differences in Probabilistic Thinking
Abstract
Cultural differences in three aspects of "probabilistic thinking" were studied. The study re-presents part of earlier work in Hong Kong and Britain and combines it with the results from a further study in Indonesia and Malaysia. The largest cultural difference was found between Asian and British student groups. The British adopted a more finely differentiated view of uncertainty, both verbally and numerically, than the Asians in response to uncertain situations. These differences are predictable neither on the basis of the relative abundance of probability expressions in the Indonesian language nor by the Malay samples' ability to discriminate English probability words on a meaningful probability discrimination dimension. For numerical probabilities assigned to almanac questions, the British were less extreme and better calibrated than the Asian students. Potential cultural influences which could account for the cultural differences were examined, and the possibility that Asian ways of dealing with uncertainty do not involve the verbal or numeric response modes studied is presented.
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“there are cultural and individual differences in the way that people think and conceptualize probabilities and uncertainty (Wright et al., 1978).”
From Individual consistency in the accuracy and distribution of confidence judgments (2016) · cites this paper as Wright et al., 1978
Citations
Cites
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Self-citation
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00003435 · Cited by 4,481
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Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T. D., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. J. (2004) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,583
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D. J., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,247
Metadata
- Authors
- Wright, G. N., Phillips, L. D., Whalley, P. C., Choo, G. T., Ng, K.-O., Tan, I., & Wisudha, A.
- Affiliations
- Brunel University of London (GB)
- Venue
- Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1978-09
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 285-299
- ISSN
- 0022-0221 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-5422
- OpenAlex
- W2114810361
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 16
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 1.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology (publishedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Cultural Differences and Values
- Keywords
- probabilistic reasoning, cultural differences, uncertainty, probability judgment, calibration, Asian students, British students, cross-cultural comparison
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