The Effect of the Focus of Comparison on Consumer Preferences
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The authors propose that the attractiveness and choice probability of an alternative can be enhanced by making it the focus of a comparison (the focal option) with a competing alternative. This proposition is supported in choice problems involving alternatives about which consumers have information in memory (e.g., frozen yogurt and fruit salad). The focal option was manipulated by asking respondents how much more or less attractive one of the two (e.g., fruit salad) was. When descriptions of alternatives’ features were provided rather than retrieved from memory, a manipulation of the focal option had a weaker and less consistent effect on preferences. Think-aloud protocols were used to gain insights into the effect of changing the focal option on decision processes. The implications of the results for marketers’ communications strategies are discussed.
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Citations
Cites
Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432
Status quo bias in decision making
Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00055564 · Cited by 5,897
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.1.193 · Cited by 5,019
Bounded rationality, ambiguity and the engineering of choice
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Cited by
Knowledge Calibration: What Consumers Know and What They Think They Know
Alba, J. W., & Hutchinson, J. W. (2000) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/314317 · Cited by 828
The Boundaries of Loss Aversion
Novemsky, N., & Kahneman, D. (2005) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.42.2.119.62292 · Cited by 703
How Can Measures of Subjective Well-Being Be Used to Inform Public Policy?
Dolan, P., & White, M. P. (2007) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00030.x · Cited by 416
“For example, preference reversals have been found to be related to the order in which options are presented (Dhar, Nowlis, & Sherman, 1999; Dhar & Simonson, 1992) and when the outcomes will be achieved (e.g., tomorrow or next year; Trope & Liberman, 2000).”
BackgroundStrangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information
John, L. K., Acquisti, A., & Loewenstein, G. (2011) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/656423 · Cited by 414
“…decision theory has documented that preferences are often influenced by factors that are difficult to justify on a normative basis, for example, by elicitation method (Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman 1990) and by the framing of alternatives (Dhar and Simonson 1992; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).”
Explanations of the endowment effect: an integrative review
Morewedge, C. K., & Giblin, C. E. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.04.004 · Cited by 339
Metadata
- Authors
- Dhar, R., & Simonson, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Marketing Research
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1992-11
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 430-440
- ISSN
- 0022-2437 (ISSN-L)
- 1547-7193
- OpenAlex
- W2114977312
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 1.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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