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Contractual Arrangements in Franchising: An Empirical Investigation
Abstract
The authors use primary data to empirically test several hypotheses about business format franchising on the basis of the theoretical model presented in Lal (1990). They find support for the hypothesis that royalty rate balances the incentives to the franchisor to invest in brand name with those to the franchisees to invest in retail service. Also consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium, the authors find that royalty rate positively affects monitoring frequency, and that monitoring costs negatively affect service level. However, contrary to the theory, the authors find that monitoring costs inversely affect monitoring frequency among franchisors. They analytically extend Lal's model to incorporate heterogeneity in monitoring costs among franchisees belonging to the same franchisor and find strong empirical support for the hypothesis that monitoring costs inversely affect monitoring frequency within a franchise system.
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Citations
Cites
The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract
Rubin, P. H. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466918 · Cited by 1,005
Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets
Caves, R. E., & II, W. F. M. (1976) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1056250 · Cited by 694
Cited by
Information Asymmetry and Levels of Agency Relationships
Mishra, D. P., Heide, J. B., & Cort, S. G. (1998) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1177/002224379803500301 · Cited by 553
An Empirical Investigation of Ex Post Transaction Costs in Franchised Distribution Channels
Dahlstrom, R., & Nygaard, A. (1999) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1177/002224379903600202 · Cited by 387
Blair, R. D., & Lafontaine, F. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511753879 · Cited by 364
A Cross-Disciplinary Exploration of Entrepreneurship Research
Duane Ireland, R., & Webb, J. W. (2007) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206307307643 · Cited by 345
Dant, R. P., & Nasr, N. I. (1998) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/s0883-9026(97)00040-2 · Cited by 168
Metadata
- Authors
- Agrawal, D., & Lal, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Marketing Research
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1995-05
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 213-221
- ISSN
- 0022-2437 (ISSN-L)
- 1547-7193
- OpenAlex
- W1992476865
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 24.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Agrawal, D., & Lal, R. (1995). Contractual Arrangements in Franchising: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Marketing Research. https://doi.org/10.1177/002224379503200208
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.