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Control techniques and upward flow of information in franchising in distant markets: conceptualization and preliminary evidence
Open accessAbstract
Information exchange between franchisees and franchisors is viewed as instrumental for the attainment of both firm-specific and systemic goals within franchise systems. Our study investigates the issue of control and control techniques employed by franchisors to monitor the performance of their franchisees in distant markers with special focus on the role of information exchange. A major assumption underlies our work. Even though, in the language of agency theory, franchise contracts attempt to align the incentives of the principal (i.e., franchisor) and the agent (i.e., franchisee), such alignment is not easy to achieve due to basic conflicts in the parties' respective goals. For instance, while franchisees are primarily interested in achieving short-term profits, franchisors are more concerned about strengthening the brand equity of their systems. A perfect upward flow of information (i.e., from franchisees to franchisors), therefore, is not necessarily guaranteed. This paper introduces and empirically evaluates four hypotheses relating franchisees' willingness to provide information to their respective franchisors. First, it is suggested that franchisees' willingness to provide information to their franchisors will be positively related to the incidence of repeat purchases since incentives to free-ride are expected to be low at such units in repeat customer industries; hence, franchisees will have little incentive to hide information. Second, it is argued that the greater the age of relationship between the focal franchisee and franchisor, the more secure both parties are likely to feel about the projection of this relationship into the future; consequently, a positive relationship between the age of the franchise relationship and franchisees' willingness to provide information to franchisors is proposed. Next, we suggest that the level of competition faced by franchisees is positively related to franchisees' willingness to provide information to their franchisors. The latter effect is expected for two reasons. Foremost, such franchisees are likely to see the availability of authentic market information as a necessary tool for their franchisors if franchisors are to provide them with accurate, localized advice for combating competitive forces. Second, from an agency theory perspective, franchisees have an incentive to conceal information about the external environmental factors only if such information serves to explain franchisees' business success in terms of forces other than their effort. This would not occur in a competitive environment setting. Finally, multi-unit franchisees are hypothesized to more willingly provide information to their franchisors than their single-unit counterparts given their lower incentives to free-ride and the higher level of security felt in their relationships with their franchisors. The empirical verification of our contentions was carried out in two stages. First, we studied in-depth, the case of Lebanon, to develop the initial descriptive materials. Second, and based on the first step, we surveyed U.S. based franchisors with franchisees in the Middle East and Africa to assess our hypotheses. Results show that while the extent of competition faced by franchisees was found to be an incentive to provide information to franchisors, the age of the relationship emerged as a disincentive to sharing information with the franchisors.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper conceptualizes control and upward information flow between franchisors and franchisees in distant markets, using agency theory, a Lebanon case study, and a survey of U.S. franchisors operating in the Middle East and Africa. In the small survey (n=20), competition was positively associated and relationship age negatively associated with franchisees’ provision of information; the repeat/nonrepeat and multi-unit hypotheses could not be tested.
Key findings
- H3 was supported: the level of competition faced by franchisees was positively related to their provision of information to franchisors (γ=0.50, p<.05 at the latent construct level; indicator effects 0.23–0.48). H2 was not supported: age of the franchise relationship was negatively related to information provision (γ=−0.49, p<.05; indicator effects −0.23 to −0.47). H1 and H4 were untestable because only one questionnaire referenced a nonrepeat-purchase unit and all focal franchisees were multi-unit.
- Franchisor-reported control techniques included asking for regular financial reports (89.5%), occasionally hiring an audit firm (10.5%), occasionally paying surprise visits (26.3%), and hiring a market research firm (10.5%). Compensation formats: royalty as a percent of franchisee sales (73.7%), royalty as a percent of franchisee profits (0.0%), and flat annual fee as royalty (36.8%).
- The Lebanon case found franchisees routinely reported tight control attempts, widespread management control, and audit provisions in all agreements; there was anecdotal evidence that franchisees sometimes bribed auditing/market research firms to provide rosy, inaccurate market information. The final franchisor survey, however, revealed a minimal level of control beyond what is usual in domestic contexts, contradicting the exploratory franchisee-level reports.
- The information-sharing measure used 24 items across seven aspects and showed Cronbach’s alphas between 0.66 and 0.93. Only 50% of respondents could provide the focal franchisee’s approximate market share, and 21.1% reported not knowing it. The MIMIC model fit was χ²=48.32, df=26, p=.005; NNFI=0.80; CFI=0.86; RMR=0.069.
Methods
- Two-part design: first, an in-depth case study of franchising in Lebanon using unstructured and structured interviews with Ministry of Economy and Commerce officials, consulting/trademark/franchise-contract managers, and managers of U.S. franchised units; second, a survey of U.S.-based franchisors with franchised units in the Middle East and Africa.
- Sampling and respondents: sampling frame drawn primarily from the 1995 Bond’s Franchising Guide plus other guides/directories; included franchises with overseas units above the median for their industry. Two questionnaires were administered by fax/mail (prescreening and study questionnaire). Final inferential n=20 (21 completed, one excluded because the focal unit operated under management control rather than a franchise contract); response rates were 50.9% and 60.4% for the first and second questionnaires.
- Measures and analysis: dependent variable was a 24-item scale measuring seven aspects of information sharing (willingness, completeness, promptness, relevancy/usefulness, accuracy, market information, directionality); independent variables included age of relationship, competition (5-point scale and inverse market share), repeat/nonrepeat dummy, and multi-unit dummy. Main analysis used a MIMIC path model, reliability and discriminant validity checks, and nonresponse-bias comparison of early versus late respondents via MANOVA (nonsignificant).
Limitations
- Paper-stated: the small number of prospective companies limited the methodology—the sample could not be restricted to particular industries or more homogeneous samples, multiple guides/directories were needed, and the small population made a formal statistical pretest and second-order procedures impractical. H1 and H4 were untestable because only one nonrepeat unit and only multi-unit franchisees appeared in the data. The MIMIC model’s poor fit was partly attributed to omitted variables, and the four factors isolated were not an exhaustive list of causes. The study deals only with postcontractual franchising problems, not precontractual issues.
- Paper-stated: control findings differed between the exploratory franchisee-level interviews and the final franchisor-level survey; measures were self-reported, and reliable secondary data were absent in the markets studied.
- Evident from the text: n=20 is very small, the survey captures franchisor perceptions rather than franchisee behavior, and the cross-sectional design limits causal inference and generalizability to other distant markets.
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2 Valid · 5 Not valid · 48 Not checked · 77 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“Lafontaine and Kaufmann's (1994) findings support the notion of a modified resource constraints theory that recognizes the synergistic effects of dual distribution.”
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > CONTROL TECHNIQUES
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Lafontaine and Kaufmann 1994 source
The Abstract explicitly says the empirical findings support a modified resource constraint theory that recognizes the synergistic effects of dual distribution. The Conclusion explains that franchisers may add company-owned outlets as resource constraints ease while retaining a mix of ownership to gain those synergistic benefits. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Firms op-erating in the Middle East and Africa clearly face a different classification than the one believed to hold in domestic franchising contexts (Brickley and Dark 1987;Caves and Murphy 1976;Manolis et al. 1995).”
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Brickley and Dark 1987 source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Caves and Murphy 1976 source
- Could not verifycites Manolis et al. 1995 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Method (p. 3) describes data from franchisors operating in America, and the Conclusions (p. 7) address ownership changes in franchised outlets. Searches for “Middle East and Africa” and “classification” found no passage comparing firms in those regions with domestic franchising contexts. (LLM, conf=0.76)
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Interestingly, 21.1% of the respondents reported their inability to provide such a value because they did not know it, thereby underscoring the extent of dependence of franchisors on their franchisees for information in distant markets.”
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > Measures
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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In the paper
“It is, however, worth noting that for the firms able to estimate market share, a negative correlation exists between the two measures of competition (r ϭ Ϫ0.1481; p ϭ .69).”
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > Measures
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, we found strong support for our third hypothesis (i.e., a significant positive relationship was found to exist between the level of competition franchisees face and their willingness to provide their franchisors with information, ␥ ϭ 0.50, p Ͻ .05).”
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > Hypotheses Tests
boostedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > Hypotheses Tests
“a significant negative relationship was uncovered between the age of a franchise relationship and franchisees' willingness to provide their franchisors with information (␥ ϭ Ϫ0.49, p Ͻ .05) at both, the latent construct and individual indicator levels.”
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
“| Relevancy/Usefulness | Ϫ0.23 | (Ϫ1.62) | 0.23 | (1.63) |”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > Respondent Profile
“Following Armstrong and Overton (1977), nonre- sponse bias was estimated by comparing early respondents with late respondents.”
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > References
“9. Armstrong, J. Scott, and Overton, Terry S. 1997. Establishing nonresponse bias in mail surveys.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > Hypotheses Tests
“However, we found strong support for our third hypothesis (i.e., a significant positive relationship was found to exist between the level of competition franchisees face and their willingness to provide their franchisors with information, ␥ ϭ 0.50, p Ͻ .05).This pattern was supported at the latent construct as well as the indicator levels.”
§ CONTROL TECHNIQUES AND UPWARD FLOW OF INFORMATION IN FRANCHISING IN DISTANT MARKETS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE > DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
“| Relevancy/Usefulness | Ϫ0.23 | (Ϫ1.62) | 0.23 | (1.63) |”
Citations
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Cited by
Franchising: A Review and Avenues to Greater Theoretical Diversity
Combs, J. G., Michael, S. C., & Castrogiovanni, G. J. (2004) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/j.jm.2004.06.006 · Cited by 450
“…conflict is inherent in the relationship because franchisors benefit from royalties tied to chain-wide sales whereas franchisees benefit from outlet profit, giving franchisors incentive to engage in programs that enhance sales at the expense of profits (Dant & Nasr, 1998; Spinelli & Birley, 1996).”
BackgroundInternational franchising: A literature review and research agenda
Rosado-Serrano, A., Paul, J., & Dikova, D. (2018) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.12.049 · Cited by 401
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Franchising research on emerging markets: Bibliometric and content analyses
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“…/ Descriptive N/A Resource-based theory Baena (2009) Quantitative Regression Transaction cost theory International franchise partnerships Dant and Nasr (1998) Quali-Quanti In-depth study / MANOVA Agency theory Xiao et al. (2008) Quantitative Descriptive statistics / X2-tests Agency…”
BackgroundInfluentialA model of trust and compliance in franchise relationships
Davies, M. A. P., Lassar, W., Manolis, C., Prince, M., & Winsor, R. D. (2011) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2009.09.005 · Cited by 252
Metadata
- Authors
- Dant, R. P., & Nasr, N. I.
- Affiliations
- Boston University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Dant, Rajiv P.
- Venue
- Journal of Business Venturing
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1998-01
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-28
- ISSN
- 0883-9026 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2071686045
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 81
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 7.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- www.elsevier.com/legal/tdmrep-license (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ (vor, 161 d)
- Locations
- Journal of Business Venturing (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Franchising Strategies and Performance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting and Organizational Management
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Customer Service Quality and Loyalty
- Keywords
- franchising, information sharing, franchisor-franchisee relationship, control techniques, agency theory, free-riding, repeat purchase, relationship age, competition, brand equity, relationship security
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Control techniques and upward flow of information in franchising in distant markets: conceptualization and preliminary evidence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0883-9026(97)00040-2
- The paper
- Dant, R. P., & Nasr, N. I. (1998). Control techniques and upward flow of information in franchising in distant markets: conceptualization and preliminary evidence. Journal of Business Venturing. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0883-9026(97)00040-2
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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