Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict
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This article identifies and addresses key conceptual and measurement issues raised by measures of state capacity in studies of civil conflict. First, it reviews competing definitions and operationalizations of state capacity, focusing specifically on those that emphasize (1) military capacity, (2) bureaucratic administrative capacity, and (3) the quality and coherence of political institutions. Second, it critically assesses these measures on the basis of construct validity, focusing attention on whether they accurately capture the theoretical concept of state capacity, and whether they allow the researcher to differentiate between competing causal mechanisms. Third, it employs principal factor analysis to identify the underlying dimensionality of 15 different operationalizations of state capacity. State capacity is characterized by low dimensionality, with three factors — or dimensions of state capacity — explaining over 90% of the variance in the 15 measures. While the first factor, rational legality, captures bureaucratic and administrative capacity, the second, rentier-autocraticness, and third, neopatrimoniality, capture aspects of state capacity that cut across theoretical categories. The article concludes by suggesting a multivariate approach to modeling state capacity, and that (1) survey measures of bureaucratic quality, and (2) tax capacity are the most theoretically and empirically justified.
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Subsequent studies have confirmed Fearon and Laitin's original state-weakness claim by measuring bureaucratic state capacity more directly.
“While Fearon and Laitin (2003) use GDP per capita as a proxy to test the stateweakness argument, subsequent studies have confirmed the original claim by measuring bureaucratic state capacity more directly (Hendrix 2010; Fearon 2011).”
From Dynamics and Logics of Civil War (2017) · cites this paper as Hendrix 2010
Cites
Reliability and Validity Assessment
Carmines, E., & Zeller, R. (1979) · doi:10.4135/9781412985642 · Cited by 5,884 · see citing works
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 3× · see citing works
“First, military expenditures and employment can enhance the repressive capacity of the state, but they also may constitute selective benefits that political leaders can use to engender political loyalty at the expense of combat effectiveness (Henderson & Singer, 2000; Howe, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Gupta…”
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- Authors
- Hendrix, C. S.
- Affiliations
- University of North Texas (US)
- Corresponding author
- Hendrix, Cullen S
- ORCID
- Hendrix, Cullen S
- Venue
- Journal of Peace Research
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-05-01
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 273-285
- ISSN
- 0022-3433 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-3578
- OpenAlex
- W2065891914
- Cited by
- 795
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 25 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 61 · 2023: 41 · 2022: 79 · 2021: 71 · 2020: 72 · 2019: 75 · 2018: 57 · 2017: 43 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 41 · 2014: 67 · 2013: 47 · 2012: 27
- FWCI
- 97.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Journal of Peace Research (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Peacebuilding and International Security
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
- Keywords
- state capacity, civil conflict, military capabilities, political institutions, construct validity, neopatrimonialism, tax capacity, bureaucratic quality
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