Civil war peace agreement implementation and state capacity
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Negotiated civil war terminations differ from their interstate war counterparts in that one side must disarm and cease to exist as a fighting entity. While termination through military victory provides a relatively more enduring peace, many civil wars end with peace agreements signed after negotiations. However, research has shown that the implementation of civil war peace agreements is difficult and prone to collapse. Often these failures are followed by recurrence of the conflict. In some cases, the agreements break down before key provisions are implemented. This article adds to this topic by focusing on the role of state capacity in peace agreement success. We argue that peace agreements and state capacity are necessary but not sufficient conditions for sustainable peace. The article employs a case study approach to explore the importance of state capacity in implementing civil war peace agreements. The role of third-party interventions is also considered. The cases (United Kingdom—Northern Ireland, Indonesia—Aceh, Burundi, Mali, and Somalia) include 14 peace agreements that vary by war type (secessionist or control over government), type of agreement (comprehensive or partial), levels of state capacity (high or low), and peace success (success, partial or failure), and each experienced third-party involvement in the peace process.
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Citations
Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options
Seawright, J., & Gerring, J. (2008) · Political Research Quarterly · doi:10.1177/1065912907313077 · Cited by 3,827
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?
Fearon, J. D. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043770 · Cited by 1,306
The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement
Walter, B. F. (1997) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081897550384 · Cited by 1,083
Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post‐Civil War Conflict Management
Hartzell, C., & Hoddie, M. (2003) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/1540-5907.00022 · Cited by 709
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Cited by
Masters of their domains: The role of state capacity in civil wars
Sobek, D. (2010) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343310362295 · Cited by 124
“Finally, DeRouen et al. (2010) argue that capable states are more able to commit to negotiated agreements, making the settlements more stable.”
BackgroundPrecipitating state failure: do civil wars and violent non-state actors create failed states?
Aliyev, H. (2017) · Third World Quarterly · doi:10.1080/01436597.2017.1319276 · Cited by 38
The politics of survival or business as usual? Exploring the effects of armed conflict on corruption
Lohaus, M., & Bussmann, M. (2021) · Journal of International Relations and Development · doi:10.1057/s41268-020-00186-9 · Cited by 6
“Weak states find it difficult to commit to negotiated solutions to end a conflict, making the successful implementation of peace agreements less likely (DeRouen et al. 2010).”
Metadata
- Authors
- DeRouen, K., Ferguson, M. J., Norton, S., Park, Y. H., Lea, J., & Streat-Bartlett, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Peace Research
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-05-01
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 333-346
- ISSN
- 0022-3433 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-3578
- OpenAlex
- W2167032082
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 13.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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