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Cited by 1,306Political Conflict and GovernancePeacebuilding and International SecurityPost-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics

Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?

Fearon, James D·2004·Journal of Peace Research
DOI 10.1177/0022343304043770
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Abstract

Five factors are shown to be strongly related to civil war duration. Civil wars emerging from coups or revolutions tend to be short. Civil wars in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have also tended to be relatively brief, as have anti-colonial wars. By contrast, ‘sons of the soil’ wars that typically involve land conflict between a peripheral ethnic minority and state-supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group are on average quite long-lived. So are conflicts in which a rebel group derives major funding from contraband such as opium, diamonds, or coca. The article seeks to explain these regularities, developing a game model focused on the puzzle of what prevents negotiated settlements to long-running, destructive civil wars for which conflicting military expectations are an implausible explanation. In the model, regional autonomy deals may be unreachable when fluctuations in state strength undermine the government’s ability to commit. The commitment problem binds harder when the center has an enduring political or economic interest in expansion into the periphery, as in ‘sons of the soil’ wars, and when either government or rebels are able to earn some income during a conflict despite the costs of fighting, as in the case of contraband funding.

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  • The findings suggest that the sons-of-the-soil type of civil war emphasized by Fearon (2004) is a special case of ethno-political exclusion.

    “The findings suggest that the sons-of-the-soil type of civil war emphasized by Fearon (2004) is a special case of ethno-political exclusion.”

    From Dynamics and Logics of Civil War (2017) · cites this paper as Fearon (2004)

  • Fearon develops a bargaining model that shows how commitment problems block negotiated conflict resolution rather than uncertainty.

    “To explain these inductively derived empirical patterns, Fearon develops a bargaining model that shows how commitment problems block negotiated conflict resolution rather than uncertainty.”

    From Dynamics and Logics of Civil War (2017) · cites this paper as Fearon (2004)

  • If renewed rebellion is primarily a function of opportunities, power sharing should be inherently difficult to achieve and maintain because of severe commitment problems.

    “If renewed rebellion is primarily a function of opportunities, power sharing should be inherently difficult to achieve and maintain because of severe commitment problems (Fearon 2004; Walter 1997).”

    From Dynamics and Logics of Civil War (2017) · cites this paper as Fearon 2004

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Authors
Fearon, J. D.
Affiliations
Stanford University (US)
Corresponding author
Fearon, James D
Venue
Journal of Peace Research
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2004-05-01
Volume
41
Issue
3
Pages
275-301
ISSN
  • 0022-3433 (ISSN-L)
  • 1460-3578
DOI
10.1177/0022343304043770
OpenAlex
W2116559484
Cited by
1,306
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 34 · 2025: 59 · 2024: 50 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 93 · 2020: 77 · 2019: 53 · 2018: 56 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 71 · 2015: 78 · 2014: 75 · 2013: 68 · 2012: 64
FWCI
134.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
academic.oup.com/pages/standard-publication-reuse-rights (vor)
Locations
  • Journal of Peace Research (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Peacebuilding and International Security
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics
Keywords
civil war duration, ethnic conflict, rebel financing, commitment problem, negotiated settlement, state strength, former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe

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